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SMART REGULATION AND FEDERALISM FOR THE
SMART GRID
Joel B. Eisen*
This Article examines the “Smart Grid,” a set of concepts, technologies, and oper-
ating practices that may transform America’s electric grid as much as the Internet has
done, redefining every aspect of electricity generation, distribution, and use.  While the
Smart Grid’s promise is great, this Article examines numerous key barriers to its devel-
opment, including early stage resistance, a lack of incentives for consumers, and the
adverse impacts of the federal-state tension in energy regulation.  Overcoming these
barriers requires both new technologies and transformative regulatory change, begin-
ning with the development of a foundation of interoperability standards (rules of the
road governing interactions on the Smart Grid) that will influence development for
many years.  This Article describes the federally coordinated standard-setting process
started in the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act, leading to a collaborative
dialogue among hundreds of participants, with leadership from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (“NIST”).  After setting forth the need for interoperability
standards and elaborating on the standard-setting process, the Article focuses on a
2011 order by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) that declined to
adopt an initial group of standards.  While this may appear a step backward, the Article
argues to the contrary, finding that FERC’s order supports the flexibility of the Smart
Grid Interoperability Panel, the NIST-led process that will produce interoperability
standards critical to a wide range of energy saving technologies.  FERC’s order allows
this process, not a regulator’s imprimatur, to give standards credibility.  By holding off
on forcing adoption of the standards, but preserving the potential for more significant
federal intervention later, it may lead to state adoption of the resulting standards.  In
this adaptive approach to energy law federalism, neither top-down federal regulation
nor private sector standard setting is the exclusive means of overseeing Smart Grid
development.  FERC’s approach may promote a more positive federal-state relationship
in the development of the Smart Grid, and may even portend a more collaborative rela-
tionship in energy law federalism generally, avoiding the disruptive jurisdictional
clashes that have marked recent attempts to innovate in the electric grid.
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INTRODUCTION
We are at the early stage of creating a Smart Grid, a radically upgraded
national electric network that would resemble the Internet in anticipated scale
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and complexity.  The efforts to develop a Smart Grid have two different but
related objectives: modernizing our electric system’s antiquated architecture
and providing consumers with dramatic new ways to make, use, and conserve
electricity.1  The electric grid delivers the product on which modern life de-
pends,2 but is the last major network to hold out against fundamental change.3
Replacing it with a sophisticated energy ecosystem could enable interactive
consumer applications that would yield immense environmental and economic
benefits.  There would be spectacular technological breakthroughs, the rise of
entire new industries,4 and consumer uses far beyond anyone’s wildest dreams.
The Smart Grid could be a strong, secure, multifunctional network5 that would
be a critical response to climate change, bringing together numerous generation
sources and energy-saving technologies into a seamless web.
However, the Smart Grid begins with monopoly utilities in place.  This is
as if we developed the Internet with just one computer company, instead of the
competitive ecosystem of hardware and software providers we have today.
That company would have its profit guaranteed by government regulation and
therefore little incentive to innovate.6  The Smart Grid therefore requires both
new technologies and transformative regulatory change.  Allowing for the In-
ternet era’s mode of disruptive innovation7 to bring new services and products
to the electric utility industry requires a nimble and open foundation.  The
1 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID
INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS 23 (Release 1.0 2010) [hereinafter NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0]; MASS.
INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 20 (2011).  Section 1301 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 defines the Smart Grid in over ten different objectives that
make up a broad collection of ambitious goals. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17381 (West 2012).
2 ANDRES CARVALLO & JOHN COOPER, THE ADVANCED SMART GRID: EDGE POWER DRIVING
SUSTAINABILITY 185 (2011) (“Our society has become so dependent on electricity that electricity
should be inserted into Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, at its base.”).
3 Smart Grid Initiatives and Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Suedeen Kelly, Commissioner, Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission), available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hear-
ings-and-business-meetings?ID=aa1ce631-aae4-f0e3-0756-d667268c8551 (“Digital technologies
have transformed other industries such as telecommunications.  A similar change has not yet hap-
pened for the electric grid.”); NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE
21ST CENTURY GRID: ENABLING OUR SECURE ENERGY FUTURE v (2011) (“[T]he traditional elec-
tricity infrastructure has changed little from the original design and form of the electric grid as
envisioned by Thomas Edison and George Westinghouse at the end of the 19th century.”).
4 See, e.g., PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 157-74 (2010) (discussing different business models for the
Smart Grid, some of which would radically transform the electric utility industry).
5 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., DRAFT NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR
SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS 26 (Release 2.0 2011) [hereinafter NIST FRAME-
WORK 2.0].
6 See generally Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility,
39 ENVTL. L. 931 (2009); see infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
7 Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case for Solar
Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53, 58–60 (2010); Tim Wu, Network Neutral-
ity, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003) (referring to
technology and business model innovations that deliver new value to consumers as “a system of
belief about innovation, one that has gained significant popularity over [the] last two decades,”
which Wu terms the “evolutionary model.”).
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Smart Grid’s regulatory base of “interoperability”8 standards must be this foun-
dation.  Like Internet protocols, these technical standards will have impacts for
decades.9  Far from being dry technical documents, they will have profound
effects on utilities, suppliers, vehicle and appliance manufacturers, and every
consumer of electricity.10
Standards, in short, are regulations,11 and the development of effective
interoperability standards will influence Smart Grid development for years to
come.  Standard-setting normally involves consensus decisions by industry par-
ticipants.12  However, this Article contends that the Smart Grid requires a feder-
ally-coordinated standard-setting process, due to the size of the endeavor,
massive coordination difficulties, risk of technology balkanization, and pres-
ence of important national interests.  With numerous unconnected, proprietary
utility systems, and little standardization,13 Smart Grid standard-setting is a
complex endeavor requiring considerable effort.  Without national standards,
51 different state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) could adopt 51 different
Smart Grid models, or implement systems that fail to protect the grid from
cyberattacks.14
In the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (“EISA”), Congress
established a process to set standards in collaborative dialogue among hundreds
of participants, with leadership from the National Institute of Standards and
8 The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines “interoperability” as “[t]he
capability of two or more networks, systems, devices, applications, or components to exchange
and readily use information — securely, effectively, and with little or no inconvenience to the
user.” NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 21. See generally GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE R
COUNCIL, INTEROPERABILITY CONTEXT-SETTING FRAMEWORK (2007) (discussing different levels
and attributes of interoperability); see infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text. R
9 Empowering Consumers and Promoting Innovation through the Smart Grid: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation of the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of George W. Arnold, National Coordinator for
Smart Grid Interoperability, National Institute of Standards and Technology) [hereinafter Arnold
SS&T Testimony] (“[T]he foundation we lay with these standards likely will establish the basic
architecture of the grid for decades.”).
10 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Technical Conference on Smart Grid Interoperability
Standards, Opening Remarks by George Arnold, NIST (Jan. 31, 2011), at 4 [hereinafter Opening
Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011], available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/
upload/technical_conference_013111.pdf; see also generally Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
Technical Conference Smart Grid Interoperability Standard Transcript Document No. RM11-2-
000 (Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter FERC Technical Conference 2011] (containing additional sup-
porting statements by industry participants) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
11 Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
179, 179 (2009).
12 Arnold SS&T Testimony, supra note 9, at 8 (“[F]ew, if any, interoperability standards have R
ever been adopted in regulation for national infrastructures such as the legacy electric grid, the
telecommunications system, or the Internet . . . .  In the US, the vast majority of standards are
accepted by the market on a purely voluntary basis without any regulatory action or
consideration.”).
13 Arnold SS&T Testimony, supra note 9, at 3 (“The U.S. grid, which is operated by over 3200 R
electric utilities using equipment and systems from hundreds of suppliers, has historically not had
much emphasis on interoperability or standardization.”).
14 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-117, ELECTRICITY GRID
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT KEY CHALLENGES
REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED (2011).
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Technology (“NIST”).  NIST uses a process to develop standards, which it
submits to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).  FERC then
decides whether to adopt the standards as legally binding regulations.15  In July
2011, FERC decided, in its Order on Smart Grid Interoperability Standards,16
that it would not begin a rulemaking proceeding on the first five standards sent
to it.  The result was a widespread perception that FERC had put the brakes on
the standard-setting process and, therefore, on Smart Grid development as a
whole.
This Article argues to the contrary.  It concludes that FERC’s order sup-
ports the flexibility of the NIST process and its creative federally-led crowd-
sourcing that puts different agents to work to solve the “wicked” problem17 of
standard-setting in a complex, heavily regulated environment.  FERC’s order
allows the process, not a regulator’s imprimatur, to give standards credibility.
By holding off on forcing states to adopt the standards, but preserving the po-
tential for more significant federal intervention later, it also embraces an adap-
tive approach to energy law federalism.  This is necessary in the current
landscape of jurisdictional clashes between the states and the federal govern-
ment, because states suggested that a federal takeover of the standards process
would provoke conflict and uncertainty.  Under the FERC order, states will
eventually rely on the standards, even if FERC does not technically mandate
them and intervenes only in limited instances.  Thus, rather than seeing federal-
ism as a barrier to change, FERC’s approach may promote a more positive
approach to the federal-state relationship.
Part I discusses the Smart Grid and its revolutionary potential for utilities
and consumers.  Part II discusses the numerous key barriers to Smart Grid de-
velopment, including early stage resistance, lack of incentives for consumers,
and the adverse impacts of the federal-state tension in energy regulation.  Part
III discusses the need for interoperability standards, the federally led process to
set the standards, and a case study involving standards for energy use informa-
tion that helped enable a recent “Green Button Initiative,” which allows con-
sumers to view their electricity data.
Part IV discusses the FERC order and concludes that it was the proper
result for two reasons.  First, it validates the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel
(“SGIP”), the NIST process that will produce results that will be hailed as
foundational to a wide range of energy saving technologies.  Second, and per-
haps just as importantly, it may lead to state adoption of standards created in a
federally-led process.  This promotes an approach to energy law federalism in
which neither top-down federal regulation nor private-sector standard-setting is
the exclusive means of overseeing Smart Grid development.  The SGIP process
and FERC’s response to it are therefore especially noteworthy, because they
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 17385(d) (West 2012).
16 FERC, Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, RM11-2-000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,039 (July 19,
2011) [hereinafter FERC Standards Order].
17 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Re-
straining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009), for a discussion of
the literature on “wicked” problems and its application to multifaceted challenges such as this.
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establish a novel approach to defining the federal-state relationship that would
avoid the disruptive jurisdictional clashes that have marked recent attempts to
innovate in the electric grid.
I. THE SMART GRID’S POTENTIAL
As one observer puts it, “[t]hinking about building Smart Grids is similar
to saying that we are going to ‘build the internet.’” 18  The “Smart Grid” is
generally understood as “concepts, technologies, and operating practices in-
tended to bring the electric grid into the 21st century.”19  This will change the
grid “more in the next 10 years than it has in the past 100 years,”20 but there is
little agreement on what that will entail.  In 2009, the Department of Energy
(“DOE”) reported in its first biennial report to Congress that the Smart Grid
may transform America as much as the Internet has done, redefining every
aspect of electricity generation, distribution, and use.21  The EISA describes the
Smart Grid as a system capable of accomplishing over ten diverse objectives.22
Comprehensive policy frameworks from the federal government and state util-
ity regulators,23  Smart Grid alliances, individual utilities and trade associa-
tions,24 and others contain proposals for specific actions and resource decisions.
These visions are so different that they cannot be summarized or recon-
ciled easily.25  Compare the electric grid to a reliable 10-year-old automobile
that runs capably and enables its owner to commute each day.  Improving elec-
tric utility infrastructure is like upgrading the car’s systems, or replacing the
18 A123 SYSTEMS, ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS IN EMERGING SMART GRID APPLICATIONS
(2009), available at http://sdm.mit.edu/conf09/presentations/harvey_wilkinson.pdf.  This observa-
tion reflects the ease with which so many analogize the Internet’s norms and practices to the Smart
Grid.  The two networks involve similar policy challenges, but the Smart Grid will be different in
fundamental ways.  For one, the Smart Grid involves revamping an existing network that features
extensive commercial use and legalized monopolies.  Where analogies prove useful, this Article
will employ them, but caution about doing so reflexively is in order.
19 LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., Chapters 1-3, in SMART GRID TECHNICAL ADVISORY
PROJECT, AN INTRODUCTION — SMART GRID 101 1 (2011) [hereinafter LBNL SMART GRID 101
CH. 1-3] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
20 Geoff Zeiss, Distributech Utility University: Smart Grid in North America — Progress in
Developing Standards, BETWEEN THE POLES (Jan. 23, 2012), http://geospatial.blogs.com/geospa-
tial/2012/01/distributech-utility-university-smart-grid-in-north-america-and-the-importance-of-
standards.html.
21 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT (2009), available at http://energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2009%20Smart%20Grid%20System%20Report.pdf.
22 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17381 (West 2012).
23 See, e.g., NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5; FERC, Smart Grid Policy, 128 F.E.R.C. ¶ R
61,060 (July 16, 2009) [hereinafter FERC Smart Grid Policy].  For a major state policy frame-
work, see N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CASE 10-E-0285, SMART GRID POLICY STATEMENT (2011),
available at http://nyssmartgrid.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NYPSC-Smart-Grid-Policy-
Statement.pdf.
24 See, e.g., DAVID MASTERS, DUKE ENERGY: DEVELOPING THE COMMUNICATIONS PLATFORM
TO ENABLE A MORE INTELLIGENT ELECTRIC GRID (2011), available at http://www.duke-energy.com/
pdfs/OP-David-Masters-SmartGrid-Comm-Platform-02-01-11.pdf.
25 MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 20 (“The term ‘smart grid’ has been used to refer to R
a wide variety of electric grid modernization efforts and ideas over the past several years.”).
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car.  The paradigm shift from centralized, one-directional power flow from gen-
eration resources through the transmission-distribution system, into two-way
dynamic flows, is like selling the reliable car and switching to more complex
but more efficient public transit.  Consider the implications of this breathtaking
statement: “Just as the Internet connected commerce, banking, entertainment,
digital media, voicemail systems, and all the other systems that generate or
consume information, tomorrow’s energy system should connect — or integrate
— all of the systems and community assets that will consume or generate
electricity.”26
Advanced information and communication systems for this are largely ab-
sent.  The electric grid “has a tradition of using many proprietary customized
systems, and there has never been a need for information systems on the utility
side of the meter to interact with systems and devices on the customer side of
the meter.”27  Yet a Smart Grid means more than “computerizing” the grid.
The upheaval we foresee must take place using the spirit of innovation that
dominates our time.
The “Smart” in “Smart Grid” should reflect the concept of dynamic inno-
vation that has evolved over the past several decades.  Innovation in networks
takes place today on open platforms that draw on new energy, ideas, and dis-
tributed and meritocratic business practices.  Disruptive technologies can pro-
duce rapid organizational changes, shifting power within an industry or
displacing entire industries almost overnight.28  This phenomenon is ubiquitous
today,29 and we must therefore avoid constraining the grid’s Steve Jobs, who
would see potential where no one has seen it before.  One can imagine a Smart
Grid decades from now that is entirely different from anything contemplated
today.  The term “Internet” (or “Internetting,” as it was first called) was coined
as the first network technologies were developed, but later evolved into a much
different usage and understanding.30
A Smart Grid is therefore different from today’s grid in two fundamental
ways.  The first requires adding hardware and software to make the grid more
intelligent, in both the utility and consumer domains.  The second requires rec-
ognition of the spirit of innovation and potential for dynamic competition and
new uses.
26 PECAN ST. PROJ., WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2010).
27 Opening Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 7. R
28 Eisen, supra note 7, at 58. R
29 Wu, supra note 7, at 145. R
30 See Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, http://
www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-internet/brief-history-internet (last visited
Jan. 23, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\37-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 8  1-APR-13 11:11
8 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 37
A. Operational Improvements for a More Efficient Grid
Some useful short-term benefits will come from intelligent technologies
that will provide enhanced information and make the grid more reliable.31  Ma-
jor infrastructure companies (in some cases the same ones that upgraded the
Internet’s switchgear) are making huge bets on the Smart Grid.32
At the outset, we are faced with a paradox.  The National Academy of
Engineering has called the electric grid the most significant engineering
achievement of the 20th century, beating out such worthy contenders as the
Interstate Highway System and the Internet.33  This honor is well deserved.  The
grid is a “marvel of engineering” and one “of the most interconnected ma-
chines on Earth.”34  It works, delivering electricity on a steady, reliable basis.
Utilities have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to update the grid with
intelligence for their transmission and distribution systems.  Peer into a modern
control operator’s “cockpit,” and marvel at its human maestros’ deftness in bal-
ancing the electricity system in real time.35
Yet this is not the same as a Smart Grid.  For one, intelligence is not pre-
sent everywhere on the network.  Many locations lack sensors and other tech-
nologies that would allow system operators to understand how much electricity
is flowing or what else is happening.36  Some, but not all, utilities have Supervi-
sory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”) systems that monitor grid com-
ponents and communicate from the field about potential disaster situations.37  A
utility often only knows where an outage is located when it receives a cus-
tomer’s phone call.
Advanced systems are often “siloed,” not interconnected.38  SCADA sys-
tems use proprietary technology tailored to specific networks, which frequently
31 Learn More about Smart Grid, SMART GRID INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://
www.sgiclearinghouse.org/LearnMore (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (“Much in the way that a ‘smart’ phone these days means a phone with a com-
puter in it, smart grid means ‘computerizing’ the electric utility grid.”).
32 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 32–34. R
33 NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY GRID:
ENABLING OUR SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 1 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011.pdf.
34 NOVA: Smart Grid, (PBS television broadcast Feb. 23, 2011), transcript available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/tech/power-grid.html.
35 The difficult duties of system operators are described in Matthew L. Wald, On the Front
Lines of the Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/busi-
ness/energy-environment/behind-the-power-grid-humans-with-high-stakes-jobs.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0.
36 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 4–5. R
37 NAT’L COMMC’N SYS., TECHNICAL INFORMATION BULLETIN 04-1, SUPERVISORY CONTROL
AND DATA ACQUISITION (SCADA) SYSTEMS 4 (2004), available at http://www.ncs.gov/library/
tech_bulletins/2004/tib_04-1.pdf (“SCADA systems are used to monitor and control a plant or
equipment in industries such as telecommunications, water and waste control, energy, oil and gas
refining and transportation.  These systems encompass the transfer of data between a SCADA
central host computer and a number of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and/or Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs), and the central host and the operator terminals.”).
38 The “walled silo” metaphor is often used to describe utility systems.  Ali Ipakchi & Far-
rokh Albuyeh, Grid of the Future: Are We Ready to Transition to a Smart Grid?, IEEE POWER &
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does not connect with other utilities’ systems.39  One utility might use a third-
generation networked SCADA system built on standard communications proto-
cols,40 and another might have a simpler, older system. Proprietary systems
present a major problem in the Smart Grid, which requires careful considera-
tion of how to link billions of dollars worth of legacy equipment into an ad-
vanced communications network.
Digital technologies can improve the grid’s reliability, security, and effi-
ciency.  This will involve deploying sensors and other intelligent components to
provide system operators with more detailed data.  High-tech synchrophasors
(devices that measure conditions on transmission lines more effectively)41 and
expert communication systems would give system operators greater ability to
observe the grid’s overall condition (known as “wide-area situational aware-
ness”).  They could automatically balance power flows, report outages, and
receive weather, demand, and performance data nearly in real time.42
This advanced intelligence also allows generation to be added and distrib-
uted throughout the grid.43  Adding distributed generation (“DG”) resources to
the grid will diversify supply, reduce risks of major outages, and improve over-
all grid reliability.44  This would also encourage the use of renewable energy
generation sources (such as solar) which is an important response to climate
change.  A more supportive environment for DG would require communica-
tions protocols, data models, and intelligent controls that are still not yet well
understood.45  Researchers are working on ways to enable more widespread DG
ENERGY, Mar. 2009, at 12 (“In most cases, the information in each organizational ‘silo’ is not
easily accessible to applications and users in other functional units.”); Arnold SS&T Testimony,
supra note 9 (The electric utility industry has “many proprietary interfaces and technologies that R
result in the equivalents of stand-alone silos.”).
39 NAT’L COMMC’N SYS., supra note 37, at 8. R
40 Id. at 15.  A common standard is the IEC 60870-5 series, which, in its upgraded “6” ver-
sion, was also one of first five families of Smart Grid standards submitted by NIST to FERC.
GEORGE W. ARNOLD, SMART GRID STANDARDS READY FOR CONSIDERATION BY REGULATORS 2
(2010), available at  http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20101119155511-Arnold,
%20NIST.pdf.
41 Matthew L. Wald, For the Smart Grid, a ‘Synchrophasor’, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Apr.
1, 2010), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/for-the-smart-grid-a-synchophasor/.
42 See LISA SCHWARTZ, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJ., SMART POLICIES BEFORE SMART
GRIDS: HOW STATE REGULATORS CAN STEER INVESTMENTS TOWARD CUSTOMER-SIDE SOLUTIONS
7 (2010).  One report notes the proliferation of large data centers throughout the nation, and sug-
gests using them to handle and manage the flow of information. NAT’L ELEC. MFRS. ASS’N, STAN-
DARDIZING THE CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE LEVELS AND PERFORMANCE OF ELECTRICITY
SUPPLY CHAINS 16 (2009).
43 LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 1-3, supra note 19, at 8 (discussing the potential for adding R
generation “at bulk power transfer points, substations, other distribution locations and on the
customer side of the meter.”).
44 Lesley K. McAllister, Adaptive Mitigation in the Electric Power Sector, 2011 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 2115, 2137 (2011).
45 NAT’L ELEC. MFRS. ASS’N, supra note 42, at 13 (noting that “the integration of DG sources R
into a utility’s operation environment is still an active research field”); LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT’L LAB., USE OF FREQUENCY RESPONSE METRICS TO ASSESS THE PLANNING AND OPERATING
REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIABLE INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE GENERATION (2010), avail-
able at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/frequencyresponsemetrics-re-
port.pdf (discussing challenges of frequency regulation on the grid when integrating DG)
[hereinafter LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB. FREQUENCY REPORT] .
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integration, and more effective functioning of the grid under real-time condi-
tions.46  This is one way in which a Smart Grid entails more than simply up-
grading a piece of hardware.
B. Disruptive Consumer Applications
The Smart Grid’s potential for consumers is enormous.  At present, a typi-
cal customer’s interaction with a utility is limited to a wire into the house, a
monthly bill, and maintenance trucks that roll in during storms.  Like the dash-
board of an early 20th-century automobile, a typical utility meter today has
rudimentary instrumentation and only measures electricity usage.47  Customers
receive monthly bills, often still on paper.  Utility websites may not allow cus-
tomers to see their usage data.  Data presented are typically monthly usage
totals, with little to no information on how much electricity individual appli-
ances consume, or how consumers might alter their behavior to save energy
and money.
The Smart Grid promises to dramatically change the relationship between
utilities and their customers, starting with advanced communication systems.
“Advanced metering infrastructure,” better known as “smart meter” technol-
ogy, is the Smart Grid component most visible to consumers.48  By 2015, 65
million American homes and businesses may have smart meters that enable
two-way communication between utilities and customers.49  Smart meters allow
customers to view their real-time electricity use.  This has potential benefits for
utilities, which, for example, can manage outages more efficiently, and connect
new customers to the grid without sending trucks to their locations.50
Having near real-time information about energy usage can show consum-
ers how to reduce consumption.51  A smart meter could also show the real-time
price of electricity,52 and help consumers save money.  Demand for electricity
peaks at various times during the typical day.  Using a smart meter, a consumer
could time shift and lower her electricity usage when demand and prices are
46 LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB. FREQUENCY REPORT, supra note 45. R
47 MASS. INST. OF TECH, supra note 1, at 132–33.
48 See LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 1-3, supra note 19, at 11, 17. R
49 INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, UTILITY-SCALE SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS, PLANS, & PRO-
POSALS 1 (2012), available at http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/IEE_SmartMeter
Rollouts_0512.pdf.
50 INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SMART METERS FOR RESIDEN-
TIAL CUSTOMERS 3 (2011), available at http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/uploads/1/IEE_
Benefits_of_Smart_Meters_Final.pdf (“utility operational advantages such as outage detection
and management, remote meter reading, and remote customer (dis)connections”).  In the after-
math of Hurricane Sandy’s widespread power outages in the Northeast in 2012, some observers
noted that smart meters and other Smart Grid technologies cut the time necessary to bring power
back after major storms. See Martin LaMonica, Smart Meters Help Utility Speed Sandy Restora-
tion, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 31, 2012, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/view/
506711/smart-meters-help-utility-speed-sandy-restoration/.
51 SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 6. R
52 Id.
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high.53  As space age as it sounds, a properly-equipped washing machine could
be programmed to run at lower-cost times, or the consumer could even allow
the utility to control it, in return for financial incentives.  Little of this is in
place today, but manufacturers are scrambling to deliver advanced products to
market.54
A smart meter can also make lower-cost charging of plug-in electric vehi-
cles (“PEV”) possible by charging cars during off-peak periods.  Together with
a management system, a smart meter  can also link with battery technology
(including the batteries in PEVs and hybrid-electric vehicles) to store electricity
generated when it is inexpensive to produce.  Storage is a potential game
changer for the Smart Grid, if it allows consumers to buy electricity at inexpen-
sive times and use it later.55
Advanced communications systems can also expand consumers’ “demand
response” (“DR”)56 opportunities.  Demand response includes consumers’ vol-
untary reductions in demand through programs that reward lower electricity
use, and load control, by allowing a utility or authorized third party to control
devices directly (for example, by shutting or cycling off a device such as an air
conditioning unit in response to high demand on the system).57  Direct load
control is increasingly becoming a valuable commodity of its own in wholesale
electricity markets.58  Consumers could capture that value when a smart meter
measures the reduction in demand, which today’s load control equipment typi-
cally cannot do.59
53 Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincen-
tive for Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1540 (2012) (“Smart meter programs
also reflect the focus of DSM on shifting electricity use from peak to off-peak hours”).
54 See, e.g., Green Biz Staff, Whirlpool Set to Launch Smart Grid Compatible, GREEN BIZ
BLOG (May 8, 2009), http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2009/05/08/whirlpool-set-launch-smart-
grid-compatible-appliances-2015; Katie Fehrenbacher, 10 Ways Big Data is Remaking Energy,
GIGAOM (Jan. 29, 2012), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/10-ways-big-data-is-remaking-energy/
(“One of the biggest trends from DistribuTECH this year was the overwhelming amount of smart
thermostats that are now being sold and marketed.”).
55 Edward H. Comer, The Future of Energy Law-Electricity, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 429,
430 (2011) (president of utility trade association Edison Electric Institute noting that “the ability
to store electricity efficiently and cheaply can truly change the economics, and potentially the
structure, of the industry”); see also A123 SYSTEMS, supra note 18; James Greenberger, The Curi- R
ous Disconnect Between Smart Grid and Energy Storage, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Oct. 27,
2011), available at http://theenergycollective.com/jim-greenberger/67538/curious-disconnect-be-
tween-smart-grid-and-energy-storage.
56 NAT’L ELEC. MFRS. ASS’N, supra note 42, at 13 (“Demand response (DR) is the adjustment R
of consumer demand in response to real-time system operating conditions.”). See also generally
Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates The Smart Grid?: FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response Com-
pensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, ___ SAN DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY L. ___
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with Harvard Law School Library).
57 SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 6.  The author has taken part in a pilot program by the utility R
Dominion Virginia Power involving direct load control of air conditioning units. See Former
Conservation Initiatives, DOMINION, http://www.dom.com/dominion-virginia-power/customer-ser-
vice/energy-conservation/pilot-programs.jsp (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
58 INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, supra note 49, at 10. R
59 INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, supra note 50, at 9 (noting that “load control equipment in R
use today generally cannot measure and verify usage during a load control event”).
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DR can be important to a utility as part of its overall strategy to meet
future anticipated demand and avoid unnecessary expenses of building new
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure.60  Yet while utilities
have offered DR programs for decades, they have underinvested in them.  The
utility is in effect “anti-selling” its product, and state regulation traditionally
rewards utilities for increased sales.  State PUCs are only recently embracing
“decoupling” incentives that reward utilities for promoting DR.61
The challenge of promoting DR will look like an opportunity to many
firms.62  Third parties could compete with utilities by providing energy infor-
mation and management services to consumers.63  Over time, firms that analyze
customer data (data analytics firms, for example) may become adept at parsing
through the massive data smart meters generate.64  Some are already hard at
work trying to turn data into customer empowerment.65  Eventually, these firms
might even purchase power at wholesale and supply their customers, as some
firms are already doing with commercial buildings.  Another possibility is that
entire buildings or “micro-grids” might go off the electric grid altogether, us-
ing intelligent technologies to create local networks for distribution of electric-
ity generated locally.66
60 See generally PAUL PIETSCH, ASS’N FOR DEMAND RESPONSE AND SMART GRID, DEMAND
RESPONSE & SMART GRID — STATE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLICY ACTION REVIEW:
MAY 2010 – JUNE 2011 (2011), available at http://sgstage.nrel.gov/sites/default/files/doc/files/
4512_doc_1.pdf (describing DR programs in the states).
61 BROWN, LEVITSKY, & SALTER, SMART GRID AND COMPETITION: A POLICY PAPER 94 (2011)
(“[I]n the case of most states where rates are not decoupled, a considerable part of the value of
the new meters, namely energy saving, reduces utility revenue and, therefore, is contrary to their
interest, so there is a real risk that the new devices will be underutilized with utilities in control.”);
Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 53, at 1534 (discussing this and other disincentives for DR and R
observing that “widespread demand reduction is not likely to occur until utilities shift from view-
ing efficiency and conservation as revenue erosion to a financial opportunity”).
62 2011 State of the Consumer Report, SMART GRID CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, at 4 (Jan.
31, 2011), available at http://www.pointview.com/data/files/4/3696/1942.pdf (“Building on de-
cades of commercial and industrial demand response, direct load control, and energy efficiency
programs for consumers, the utility sector is on the cusp of a similar, disruptive transformation.”).
63 Richard Tabors, Why Today’s Utilities May Soon Be Obsolete (and What May Replace
Them), SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/
Business_Markets_Pricing_News/Why-Today-s-Utilities-May-Soon-Be-Obsolete-and-What-May-
Replace-Them-1782.html.
64 Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture, Infor-
mation Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 882 (2010); see
also Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (arguing that a
societal “explosion of data” creates new opportunities for “data-driven discovery and decision-
making”).
65 Katie Fehrenbacher, supra note 54 (discussing the job of startups like OPower and Tendril) R
(“Essentially these companies have collected data on consumers and demographics and they are
using it to try to guess the best way to influence the consumer to do things like upgrade their home
appliances and lights to more efficient ones.”).
66 ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., NEEDED: A GRID OPERATING SYSTEM TO FACILITATE GRID
TRANSFORMATION 6 (2011) [hereinafter EPRI GRID 3.0] (“[E]nergy sources and a power distri-
bution infrastructure can be integrated at the local level.  This could be an industrial facility, a
commercial building, a campus of buildings, or a residential neighborhood.”). See generally Sara
C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010) for a descrip-
tion of some challenges involved.
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Sophisticated energy management systems can empower consumers, but
simplicity will be a key variable.67  Studies show that some homeowners react
favorably to the prospect of saving on their electric bills.68  Yet if an energy
management system is not “set it and forget it,” demand for it may be
ephemeral.
The literature on disruptive innovation suggests strongly that third parties
are more likely than utilities to succeed with consumers.69  As these do not yet
exist, we cannot be sure what product or business model will become dominant.
Utilities might morph into powerhouse “iUtilities”70 to provide new energy
services, but it may be too much to ask them to reverse their focus on supplying
electricity and somehow develop an Apple-like responsiveness to consumers’
needs.71  They understand technology upgrades that improve their operations
and their bottom line, but they have never sold devices such as washing ma-
chines72 or priced, marketed, or sold consumer products.
Therefore, we can and should expect that entrepreneurs will eventually
make more effective use of the Smart Grid than utilities.  Software companies
working with data, like a certain company that started with a better way to
search the Internet, might be the ultimate Smart Grid winners.73
II. KEY BARRIERS TO SMART GRID DEVELOPMENT
As dazzling as the future appears, the pace of progress is not likely to be
quick in the near-term, due to a number of barriers to more rapid development
of the Smart Grid.  These include the inherent conservatism of utilities and state
PUCs that adopt utilities’ Smart Grid proposals, an existing regulatory system
67 SMART GRID CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, supra note 62, at 5 (“[O]ptions and interfaces R
must evolve to meet the needs of less technically-oriented consumers.”).
68 See Ahmad Faruqui, Ryan Hledik & Sanem Sergici, The Brattle Group, Piloting the Smart
Grid 8–13 (June 2009) (manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1414387 (describing
customer participation in pilot programs); SMART GRID CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, supra note
62, at 16. R
69 Richard Tabors, supra note 63 (“In all likelihood, the actual form that the Smart Market R
takes will not fit neatly into one of these models.  Rather, there will be mixing and matching as
business strategies are rolled out and the results come back from early pilots.”).
70 Tomain, Steel in the Ground, supra note 6; JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY R
POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 171–74 (2011) (discussing new products and services that
an “iUtility” could offer).
71 Quinn & Reed, supra note 64, at 879 (noting that “there is no reason to think that utilities R
would be especially skilled in developing analysis and behavior modification applications, given
their traditional supply-side concerns”).
72 LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., Chapter 7, in SMART GRID TECHNICAL ADVISORY PRO-
JECT, AN INTRODUCTION — SMART GRID 101 4 (2011) [hereinafter LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH.
7] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“While Utilities can provide customers with an
air conditioner control switch, they cannot provide customers with the diversified range of appli-
ances and electronic devices that populate their premises and business which have capability and
are necessary to provide smart grid benefits.”).
73 H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & Jonathan P. Trotta, The Smart Grid: The Complexities and Impor-
tance of Data Privacy and Security, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 297, 298 (2011) (claiming that
“in our Smart Grid future, companies such as Google may play as important a role in providing
energy services as traditional electric utilities do today.”).
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that does not adequately encourage Smart Grid investments,74 consumer unfa-
miliarity with the Smart Grid (and, in some cases, resistance to it), concerns
with protecting privacy of data generated by smart meters, and a federalism
tension between the FERC and state PUCs that threatens to hamper govern-
ments’ abilities to cooperate in Smart Grid development.75  Each of these barri-
ers needs to be addressed, or the result, like everything in the utility industry, is
likely to be exceedingly slow change.
A. Utilities Lack Incentives to Innovate
For years to come, progress in building out a Smart Grid will depend on
actors (utilities) whose conservatism has retarded innovation.  Under cost of
service regulation, a utility has little incentive for taking risks.  Utilities have to
supply enough electricity to meet demand at all times.  State regulation avoids
risks to ratepayers and protects service and reliability.76  It does not offer incen-
tives for utilities to invest in innovative new technologies.77  For example, it
provides a disincentive to investing in equipment whose cost cannot be recov-
ered over a long time horizon, unless the cost can be fully recovered from
consumers.78
Although utilities have different time horizons, many plan decades ahead,
and they want to know products are proven and will stand the test of time
before they deploy them.79  The regulatory process itself takes time, and leads
to slow change.  Smart innovation, with its dynamism and the ability to learn
from failures, is not the norm.  The result is stasis.  Large utilities are like four-
teenth-century Italian city-states: powerful, independent, and content with the
status quo.  Changing this system will take time.
74 Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Realizing the Smart Grid Imperative: A
Framework for Enhancing Collaboration Between Energy Utilities and Broadband Service Prov-
iders, 9 (Summer 2011) (“[T]here appears to be an inevitable tension between how various stake-
holders, including those in the energy sector, want the smart grid to develop and the existing
regulatory structure that will ultimately guide its deployment.”).
75 See e.g., ASHLEY C. BROWN, CONTROVERSIES AND SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO SMART
GRID DEPLOYMENT (2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2010/Ashley_
BrownHEPGSept2010.pdf; Paula M. Carmody, Smarting from Resistance to the Smart Grid
(Presentation to the Harvard Energy Policy Group) (Sep. 29, 2010), available at http://www.hks.
harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2010/Paula_Carmody_HEPGSept2010.pdf.
76 Davidson & Santorelli, supra note 74, at 9, 18. R
77 Quinn & Reed, supra note 64, at 860 (noting the “now-familiar economic disincentives to R
investing in technologies that inhibit utility profitability”).
78 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 97. R
79 Kevin Dasso, The Three Most Common Misconceptions about Smart Grid, ENTREPRENEUR-
SHIP REV. (Dec. 20, 2010), available at http://miter.mit.edu/article3-most-common-misconcep-
tions-about-smart-grid-utility-perspective-kevin-dasso-sr-director-sm/ (“[U]tilities have
notoriously high standards for proven product performance before they are willing to invest. . . .
Therefore, utilities will wait for convincing demonstrations of reliability before investing, beyond
demonstrations of mere technological capability[.]”); Matthew Lynley, Why Won’t Utility Compa-
nies Innovate? Smart Grid Leaders Explain, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 4, 2010), http://venturebeat.
com/2010/11/04/why-wont-utility-companies-innovate-smart-grid-leaders-explain/ (“[U]tility
providers are often the slowest to innovate because of both reliability and cost issues[.]”).
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B. Consumers Know Little About the Smart Grid and Face High
Transaction Costs in Translating Interest Into Action
Consumer demand for the Smart Grid is lacking, as there are inadequate
incentives for consumers to adopt systems to manage their electricity consump-
tion.  Today’s Smart Grid products are not appealing to consumers.  No one is
standing in line at an Apple Store for a smart thermostat.80  These products are
“utilitarian” and do not “command the emotional connection we have with
smart phones or tablets.”81  Also, consumers may not be interested in “demand
response” because it involves using less electricity.  Many consumers may not
see the potential benefits of this,82 because they typically have little to no real-
time information about the price of electricity.83  Utilities make inadequate at-
tempts to educate their customers about the Smart Grid.  Consequently, most
consumers know little about it, and there is an “attitude-behavior gap”: Those
who view benefits most favorably are not inclined to purchase energy manage-
ment systems.84
Another major problem with Smart Grid consumer applications is that
even motivated consumers face high transaction costs simply to get started.  To
assess whether an energy management system might save electricity, a con-
sumer needs fine-grained information about current baseline usage.  Most cur-
rent meters do not generate such data, but smart meters do.  An open and
important question that has yet to be comprehensively addressed is whether
consumers would even have access to this fine-grained usage data.  There are
ongoing disputes about whether a customer or her utility owns the data a smart
meter generates.  Without a resolution of this problem, many Smart Grid bene-
fits will be hard to come by.
80 See SMART GRID CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, supra note 62, at 26–28. R
81 Eric Wesoff, Nest Labs’ Thermostat: Sexy? Yes. Functional? Maybe Not., GREENTECH ME-
DIA (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Nest-Labs-Thermostat-Sexy-
Yes.-Functional-Maybe/ (discussing the drawbacks of the Nest smart thermostat).
82 Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 53, at 1529 (noting that the “magnitude of the [DR] R
opportunity is subject to debate”).
83 Id. at 1541.
84 SMART GRID CONSUMER COLLABORATIVE, supra note 62, at 26 (noting that “those who are R
most motivated by cost savings on their bill are not necessarily the ones willing to pay more for a
home energy management system that will allow them to achieve their goals”).
An intriguing development that might address this problem is the marriage of social media and
energy efficiency in an app that allows users to post energy usage statistics and claim bragging
rights over their friends.  Leslie Meredith, New Facebook App the ‘Farmville’ of Energy Conserva-
tion?, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/10/21/new-
facebook-app-highlights-energy-conservation/; see also William Pentland, Can Smart Apps Save
the Smart Grid?, FORBES.COM (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/
2011/10/18/can-smart-apps-save-the-smart-grid/ (“‘iPhone sales only started to really explode af-
ter the apps market came online,’ said Segall. ‘Smart Apps can do the same thing for utilities,
customers and the smart grid.’”).
As Michael Vandenbergh and Jim Rossi point out, utilities have been slow to embrace social
media.  Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 53, at 1548 n.71; see also Carolyn Elefant, The R
“Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practice For Utilities Engaging Social Media, 32
ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2011) (noting that utilities were once “Web 2.0 luddites” but are now increas-
ingly experimenting with social media).
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C. Privacy Concerns Present As-Yet Unresolved Challenges
When large quantities of data are potentially transmitted over a network,
we also confront substantial privacy implications.  The voluminous literature on
Internet privacy shows how modern network technologies present an ongoing
threat to personal autonomy.85  Similarly, smart meters, devices, and systems
may generate reams of data never before available. Utilities are not accustomed
to the challenges of real-time communication over a network.86  They have not
analyzed massive amounts of consumer data and do not understand the sophis-
ticated techniques that third parties use to share data on the Internet without
individuals’ knowledge or consent.87
Some recent articles have begun to grapple with the complexities involved
in protecting consumer privacy.88  One commentator, for example, explores the
difficulties of addressing privacy concerns when third parties enter the energy
services business.89  The prospect of meshing social networking and energy us-
age reduction adds the familiar challenges of maintaining privacy in social me-
dia.90  If you can be fired because a friend posted racy pictures on your
Facebook page, we have to wonder what could happen if a friend identified
your air conditioner as an energy hog.
An additional privacy concern is that smart meters yield information that
could identify environmental behavioral patterns that regulators might want to
limit.  There is an extensive body of literature on the potential link between
environmental law (particularly addressing climate change) and individual be-
havior.91  In the Smart Grid, we find ourselves on the frontier of balancing
environmental gains and our need for eco-privacy.  Regulators might be
tempted to use Smart Grid data to achieve environmental goals, at the expense
of consumer privacy.92
85 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000);
LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE
DEATH OF PRIVACY (2012).
86 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 94. R
87 See generally ANDREWS, supra note 85. R
88 See, e.g., Sonia McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 199
(2011); Frisby, Jr. & Trotta, supra note 73; Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart R
Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (2011); Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid and the Psychology of
Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139 (2011).
89 Andreas S.V. Wokutch, The Role of Non-Utility Service Providers in Smart Grid Develop-
ment: Should They Be Regulated, and If So, Who Can Regulate Them?, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 531 (2011).
90 ANDREWS, supra note 85, at 4-5. R
91 See, e.g., Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to
Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 18,452 (2009); Michael P.
Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673
(2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge: Designing and
Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,547 (2010).
92 This theme is explored in Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: The
Promise and Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual Environmental Harms, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1565 (2012).
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This and other important privacy issues must be addressed now.  At pre-
sent, efforts to address privacy issues are ad hoc, as concerned citizens and
advocacy groups bring them to the attention of state PUCs, some of which have
taken steps to address the relevant issues.93  Without a more systematic ap-
proach, the entire Smart Grid effort might be derailed before it gets off the
ground.94
D. State PUCs Have Resisted Approving Smart Grid Projects
State PUCs have authority to regulate retail sales of electricity by distribu-
tion utilities,95 and evaluate Smart Grid project proposals subject to their juris-
diction on an individual basis.  This often includes decisions whether to allow
utilities to recover Smart Grid project costs from customers,96 using the familiar
tools of economic regulation to estimate project benefits and costs.  Across the
nation, utilities have had some successes with Smart Grid projects, but other
projects have encountered resistance from PUCs.
1. Concerns About Unquantifiable Project Benefits and Costs
The first concern for many PUCs is an asymmetry about market risk.  The
value of project benefits is hard to assess, and different in each utility’s sys-
tem.97  There is no data from successful projects yet, and PUCs must predict the
future.  PUCs have been skeptical where utilities pitch the value of operational
improvements, thinking consumers may not benefit.98  In an early case, the Ma-
ryland PSC rejected a “tracker” mechanism to allow Baltimore Gas and Elec-
93 See Decision Adopting Rules to Protect the Privacy and Security of Electricity Usage Data,
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N (July 29, 2011), available at https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/PUC%20
Smart%20Grid%20Final.pdf.
94 Quinn & Reed, supra note 64, at 874–75; see also McNeil, supra note 88, at 25–31 (calling R
for federal legislation to address Smart Grid privacy issues).
95 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJ., ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 11
(2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645 [hereinafter REGULA-
TORY ASSISTANCE PROJ. REGULATION GUIDE].
96 See id. at 36–37 (discussing costs recoverable by utilities).  FERC regulates wholesale elec-
tricity sales and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce. Id. at 11. It therefore has
authority to allow utilities to recover the costs of investments they make to the transmission sys-
tem, and FERC’s Smart Grid Policy set conditions for utilities to recover Smart Grid-related in-
vestments there.  FERC Smart Grid Policy, supra note 23. R
97 N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 32 (“[A]bsent pilot projects or other field R
studies, actual benefits are difficult to reliably predict.”); see also ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST.,
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR ESTIMATING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SMART GRID DEM-
ONSTRATION PROJECTS 2-16 to 2-23 (2010) (defining a comprehensive approach to estimating
benefits).
98 See Petition of Massachusetts Electric Company and Nantucket Electric Company National
Grid, each d/b/a National Grid for Approval of a Smart Grid Pilot Program, Order No. 09-32,
MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. UTIL. x–xi, 35–36, 41 (2010), available at http://www.env.state.ma.us/dpu/
docs/electric/09-32/72710dpuord.pdf.
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tric Company (“BGE”) to begin recovering its investment while it was
deploying over one million smart meters.99
Near-term Smart Grid approvals will be tentative, due in large part to a
chicken and egg problem.  We will not know the value of project benefits until
we move forward, but we won’t move forward without knowing we will bene-
fit.  In addition, we cannot risk compromising reliability.  Like an airplane fly-
ing at 30,000 feet, we can’t “stop” the grid,100 but we have to try new ideas to
learn what works.  This makes R&D projects,101 pilot projects and phased roll-
outs of smart meters an essential near-term strategy.  It is better to let people
test drive cars than force them to give up reliable 10-year-old vehicles.
Funding in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(“ARRA” or the “stimulus bill”)102 supported numerous Smart Grid pilot
projects.  Federal funds defraying half the cost made projects look more appeal-
ing to PUCs, and the stimulus bill had the desired stimulating effect, supporting
deployment of 18 million smart meters.103  There is considerable variety and
experimentation in these early projects.104  ARRA funding also prompted calls
for rapid development of interoperability standards, which put pressure on that
process to move quickly.
2. Concerns About Dynamic Pricing Programs
Another reason for PUC reluctance to approve many projects is that con-
sumer benefits of smart meter deployment are said to depend on “dynamic”
99 Application of Baltimore Gas & Electric Company for Authorization to Deploy a Smart
Grid Initiative and to Establish a Surcharge for the Recovery of Cost, Order No. 83410, MD. PUB.
UTIL. COMM’N 3 (2010).
100 EPRI GRID 3.0, supra note 66, at 16 (fundamental change to the grid is “like replacing an R
engine on a jet plane while it is flying at 30,000 feet.  Much like the plane, the grid needs to be
‘on’ all of the time.”).
101 Noteworthy examples of R&D aimed at testing Smart Grid concepts before their deploy-
ment in utility systems include the ongoing work at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
NREL Brings Plug and Play to Smart Grid Testing, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Jan. 31, 2012), http://
www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Business_Strategy/NREL-brings-plug-and-play-to-
smart-grid-testing-4423.html, and the ambitious Pecan Street Project in Austin, Texas, PECAN
STREET INC., http://www.pecanstreet.org/about/what-is-pecan-street-inc/  (last visited Jan. 22,
2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
102 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).  Funding for Smart Grid activities was $3.4 billion for grid modernization which was
matched one to one by industry for funding of almost $8 billion. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2010
SMART GRID REPORT 20 (2012), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Smart%20Grid%20
Investment%20Grant%20Program%20-%20Progress%20Report%20July%202012.pdf.
103 See Sunil Sharan, Betting Smartly on the Smart Grid, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 22, 2010),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/betting-smartly-on-the-smart-grid/.  See INST. FOR
ELEC. EFFICIENCY, UTILITY-SCALE SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS (2011), available at http://www.
edisonfoundation.net/iee/Documents/SmartMeter_Rollouts_0911.pdf, for a list of utilities and
their rollouts.
104 For a description of some projects supported by ARRA funding, see Jeffrey D. Roark, U.S.
Government Support for Smart Grid, ELEC. POWER INST. (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/New%20Folder/Jeff_Roark.pdf.
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pricing of electricity.105  Dynamic pricing refers to any pricing structure that
changes with the market price of electricity.106  There are many different
flavors, with esoteric names such as “time of use,”107 “critical peak pricing,”
“variable peak pricing,”108 and “real-time retail pricing.”109  All have different
mechanisms for calibrating consumers’ rates to market prices.110  Dynamic pric-
ing has been the source of experiments for decades,111 but it is not employed
widely in the residential setting, although some large utilities have residential
pricing plans with high enrollments.112  Dynamic pricing offers price signals to
consumers so they can respond actively to changing conditions by, for exam-
ple, reducing usage when rates go up.
This is dynamic pricing’s Achilles heel: It can expose consumers to market
risks.  Although research to date suggests it will yield consumer savings,113 the
conclusions are not definitive.  Dynamic pricing has generated opposition from
interest groups that believe their members’ rates will increase under dynamic
pricing structures.114  Research shows consumers can be satisfied with it once a
105 LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., Chapter 5, in Smart Grid Technical Advisory Project,
An Introduction — Smart Grid 101 12 (2011) [hereinafter LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 5] (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library) (“Are ‘Smart Rates’ necessary to achieve the benefits of
Smart Grid? The answer is YES.”).
106 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJ. REGULATION GUIDE, supra note 95, at 55. R
107 See INST. FOR ELEC. EFFICIENCY, supra note 50, at 8–9. R
108 LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 5, supra note 105, at 7 (“Variable Peak Pricing (VPP) is a R
hybrid of time use and real-time pricing, where the rating periods are defined in advance but the
prices are updated on a forecast basis.”).
109 Id. (“For real-time retail pricing (RTP) tariffs, in an organized market, energy prices are
typically linked to day-ahead or real-time energy markets and change hourly (or more frequently
— e.g. every 30 minutes).  In markets with vertically-integrated utilities that operate in regions
without organized markets, real-time prices are typically set by the utilities administratively based
on results from production cost models that reflect system conditions and estimate short-run mar-
ginal costs.”).
110 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJ. REGULATION GUIDE, supra note 95, at 55. R
111 LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 5, supra note 105, at 14 (noting that the “first tests of dy- R
namic rates began in the early 1980’s”).
112 See, e.g., Tariff Book, PACIFIC GAS & ELEC., http://www.pge.com/tariffs/ERS.SHTML
#ERS (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (schedule of
rates); John Farrell, Electricity Priced by the Hour Boosts Distributed Solar Value by a Third or
More, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/01/26/411434/
electricity-priced-by-the-hour-boosts-distributed-solar-value-by-a-third-or-more/ (discussing how
PG&E’s dynamic pricing promotes solar power systems).  Dynamic pricing has been more suc-
cessful for industrial and commercial users of electricity. LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 5, supra
note 105, at 10. R
113 See generally FARUQUI ET AL., supra note 68.  A possible alternative to reduce risk might R
be a flat-fee pricing structure.  Consumers would accept conditions such as more frequent direct
load control.  In return, they might have the option of flat-rate pricing for electricity, as long as
they did not exceed a prescribed threshold amount of use.  This could eliminate the need for
dynamic pricing, simplify pricing options, and minimize consumer risk. See, e.g., PECAN ST.
PROJ., supra note 26, at 18. R
114 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH
ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 303 (2011); Testimony of Rik Drummond Before the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology 12 (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://science.house.gov/sites/
republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/090811_Drummond.pdf (“I predict the
consumers, especially those within one of the largest voting blocks, baby boomers on a fixed
income, will react negatively to even minor cost increases caused by various regulations and
technical enhancements to the power grid.”).  A notable example of interest group opposition is
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program is underway, but other studies show dynamic pricing is unpopular
(particularly when it leads to high peak rates) and does not yield effective re-
sults.115  On the basis of these uncertainties, in several high-profile cases, PUCs
rejected dynamic pricing programs on the basis of risk to consumers.116
3. Other Concerns
Some consumers have other complaints about smart meters that have re-
duced the pace of PUC approval processes.  They believe they are nefarious
devices that control electricity use,117 pose health risks,118 or even are part of
secret government plans to snoop on them.119  Like the original objections to e-
commerce, these concerns may seem quaint a decade from now.  However,
opponents have used these arguments to gain some traction and slow the Smart
Grid’s progress in some cases.120
E. Energy Law Federalism Poses a Challenge to Federal-State Cooperation
in Building the Smart Grid
The involvement of state PUCs in building a Smart Grid, and their often
tense relationship with the federal government, makes the Smart Grid different
from any previous attempt at building networks.
Both the states and the federal government have jurisdiction over parts of
the Smart Grid.  Depending on which part of the system is involved, either
that of the AARP. See, e.g., Maureen West, Consumer Advocates Question the Benefits of Smart
Meters, AARP, Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-03-2011/smart-
meter-benefits-questioned-az.html.
115 LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 5, supra note 105, at 14; Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note R
53, at 1541. R
116 See Application for Rehearing of Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Order No. 9208,
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF MD. 1, 26 (2010).
117 Compare Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative, supra note 62, at 8 (“Consumers do not R
always view benefits the same way as utilities believe they will and are wary of utility motives.”),
with Leslie Kaufman & Kate Zernike, Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing U.N. Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/us/activists-fight-green-projects-seeing-
un-plot.html?pagewanted=all (quoting a protester as saying, “[t]he real job of smart meters is to
spy on you and control you — when you can and cannot use electrical appliances.”).
118 See, e.g., Mike Ludwig, Smart Meter Scoop: California Utility Launches Opt-Out Pro-
gram, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 3, 2012) http://www.truth-out.org/smart-meter-scoop-california-utility-
launches-opt-out-program/1328294529 (discussing the California opt-out ruling about “controver-
sial smart meters”); see also N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 35 (noting that “the RF R
emission levels of [smart meters] are exceedingly small relative to other commonly used devices
(e.g., cellular telephones)”).
119 Doug Peeples, Smart Meters: Illegal, Dangerous, Un-American? Must Be True — It’s on
YouTube, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/
Technologies_Metering/Smart-meters-Illegal-dangerous-un-American-Must-be-true-it-s-on-You-
Tube-3902.html (quoting a YouTube video called “Smart Meters” in which the narrator describes
smart meters as power company surveillance devices).
120 In 2011, Marin County, California, banned smart meters in its unincorporated areas.
Debra Kahn, California County Criminalizes Smart-Meter Installations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/05/05greenwire-calif-county-criminalizes-smart-meter-
installa-66649.html.
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FERC, a state PUC, or the governing council or board of a municipal or coop-
erative utility has jurisdiction.  As noted above, state PUCs have authority to
approve Smart Grid projects and cost recovery proposals for distribution utili-
ties that make retail sales of electricity.
Yet the Smart Grid requires coordination of efforts between the different
levels of government, and perhaps even a new distribution of regulatory author-
ity.121  If FERC attempted to change the existing distribution of authority be-
tween it and the states (for example, by setting national interoperability
standards that the states would be required to force utilities to adopt in individ-
ual projects), it could exacerbate the well-documented tension between the fed-
eral and state governments in electric utility regulation.122
Addressing and resolving this tension makes standards development an
early and highly significant test of how participants will establish their expecta-
tions about Smart Grid governance.  Decisions made now about standard-set-
ting powers will set precedents that may well be hard to reverse.
III. A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE SMART GRID:
INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS
Early Smart Grid experiments may lead to new business models and fur-
ther growth,123 but numerous barriers exist to its rapid expansion.  As a result, a
fully robust network is many years away, and everything needed to support it is
in the embryonic stage.124  Along the way, learning will be expensive.
The same spirit of dynamic, distributed, and meritocratic innovation that
extends to Smart Grid technologies should characterize our approach to the
federal and state regulatory environment.  Smart Grid regulation should be flex-
ible and facilitate a wide range of applications and new businesses.  Such regu-
lation would be smart, but the current system is not.  The rules for building a
new network have no precedent in modern life or in electric utility regulation.
Unlike the Internet, where commerce followed technology, the Smart Grid aims
to overhaul an existing network that gives utilities monopolies and guarantees
their rates of return.  This system is ill-suited to encouraging progress today.
Smart Grid regulation must evolve to address the titanic clash looming at every
node on the network between the staid utility industry and the transformative
force of modern innovation.125
121 See SGIP, SMART GRID CONCEPTUAL MODEL 8 (2010) (“The transition to the Smart Grid
introduces new regulatory considerations, which may transcend jurisdictional boundaries and re-
quire increased coordination among federal, state, and local lawmakers and regulators.”).
122 See generally Rossi & Vandenbergh, supra note 53. R
123 Smart Grid Initiatives and Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that “it is too early to assess the ‘lessons R
learned’”).
124 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 93. R
125 See Peter Fox-Penner & Heidi Bishop, Mission, Structure, and Governance in Future
Electric Markets: Some Observations, 89 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2011) (“[W]hat we have
today is a collision between public mandates that promote active or tacit vertical integration
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A significant near-term test of regulatory evolution involves the develop-
ment of interoperability standards.  Many participants believe these are a neces-
sary foundation for the Smart Grid.126  The ARRA accelerated the push for
standards, requiring federally funded projects to use “open” standards “if
available and appropriate.”127  Decisions about these standards are about far
more than superior technical merit.  Standards will have a considerable impact
on the Smart Grid’s architecture.  They will decide how utilities’ systems and
smart meters will “talk” to one another, how the grid will foster DR and DG,128
how electric vehicles will plug into and communicate with the grid, how con-
sumers’ home networks will integrate energy management capabilities, and
much, much more.129  Like the Phoenician alphabet or Internet protocols, stan-
dards for the Smart Grid promise to eliminate barriers to interactions, while
defining how those interactions take place.  Choices about standards will shape
the course of innovation, and even the most basic and fundamental choices will
have enormous consequences.  These important choices are also difficult, be-
cause a network under construction is hard to standardize.
Two major tensions characterize Smart Grid standard-setting.  The first is
that industry participants steeped in the decades-long traditions of technical
standards development and with prior experience with reliability standards will
expect the private sector to lead standards development.  Notwithstanding that
strong preference for standards developed by private sector experts, setting
Smart Grid interoperability standards requires a national effort to coordinate the
many actors and establish the basis for their interaction.  There are also specific
national objectives (notably, ensuring cybersecurity) too important to be left to
the private sector.
The second tension, introduced above in Part II, involves the unique land-
scape of Smart Grid stakeholders and their impact on standard-setting.  We are
attempting to regulate and encourage innovation on a network that already has
extensive commercial use and entrenched actors with monopoly control over
part of it.  Two different types of actors require careful consideration.  The first
is the utilities themselves. Encouraging them to collaborate with vendors and
other participants in standard-setting could exacerbate their monopoly power
and create a disadvantage for future entrants, even if near-term decisions appear
alongside a disruptive technological change that is prompting new calls for retail deintegration and
deregulation.”).
126 See, e.g., Empowering Consumers and Promoting Innovation through the Smart Grid:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation of the House Committee on Sci-
ence, Space, and Technology, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Donna Nelson, Chairman, Pub.
Util. Comm’n of Tex.) (calling for “the creation of a national set of standards that can provide
direction for utilities, industry and market participants”).
127 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 405(3), 123 Stat.
144 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17384(b)(3)(F)).
128 Alison C. Graab, The Smart Grid: A Smart Solution to a Complicated Problem, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2051, 2054 (2011).
129 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 31. R
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facially neutral.130  A difficult issue, then, is striking the democratic balance
between utilities and other stakeholders to overcome any possible capture of
the process.
The second important set of actors is the state PUCs.  Because their near-
term decisions (not those of the marketplace) will determine what interoper-
ability standards are adopted, providing guidance to them is important.  As
noted above in Part II, the prospect of any federal involvement in standard-
setting cannot be considered in isolation, but must be viewed through the lens
of contemporary energy law federalism.131
A. The Need for Standards and the Foundation of “Interoperability”
There are so many possible interactions and uncertainties in the Smart
Grid that a foundation of standards is essential to specify how these interactions
take place.132  Without standards, trying to exchange information among utili-
ties, vendors, regulators, and others, never mind linking thousands of utility
systems together, would be a veritable “Tower of Babel.”133
The Smart Grid’s complexity is staggering, with multiple domains and
thousands of actors connected in complex paths and subnetworks.134  There are
well over 100 points of interaction between subsystems in the NIST Smart Grid
conceptual model135 and substantial variety in proposals for interactions at indi-
vidual points.  For example, should the “smart” interface between a residential
customer and her utility be in a smart meter or in a different device that com-
municates directly with the network and the utility?136  This difficult and com-
130 Wu, supra note 7, at 149 (“Neutrality, as a concept, is finicky, and depends entirely on R
what set of subjects you choose to be neutral among.  A policy that appears neutral in a certain
time period, like ‘all men may vote’, may lose its neutrality in a later time period, when the range
of subjects is enlarged.”).
131 See, e.g., FERC Smart Grid Policy, supra note 23, ¶ 13 (noting that there is “a tension that R
the Proposed Policy Statement raises between federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction . . . [with
respect to] both standards adoption and applicability and whether deployed technology will be
subject to state or federal rate authority”).
132 A useful comparison is to convergence in communications industries.  Werbach, supra
note 11, at 207 (“Communications regulation developed as a series of isolated silos covering R
broadcasting, telephone networks, cable television, wireless communications, and other services.
Now those networks are converging.  When everything can be reduced to an interchangeable
digital bit, standards define how information flows across the interconnected network of
networks.”).
133 UTIL. STANDARDS BD., SMART GRID: INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDS 5 (2008).
134 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 38–42; see also Werbach, supra note 11, at 182 R
(noting that “[n]etworks are non-linear, in that there are typically multiple potential paths be-
tween two nodes, making the behavior of the networked system surprisingly complicated”).
135 MASS. INST. OF TECH, supra note 1, at 205. R
136 See, e.g., ZIGBEE ALLIANCE, ZIGBEE SMART ENERGY PROFILE SPECIFICATION 10-12 (2008)
(containing graphic demonstrations of the different architectures); EMETER, VIEWS ON SMART ME-
TERS: END USE PERSPECTIVE (2011), available at http://cat-iqconference.com/files/2011/09/Alicia-
Carrosco-his-11-09-20-CAT-iq-plan-Smart-Metering-End-User-Perspective.pdf (observing that
“the communications may be directly between the SM and smart appliances or through a gateway,
or potentially both”).
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plicated question is one of literally thousands that interoperability standards
address.
Standards do more than make interaction possible. They can resolve con-
fusion and promote investments in technology, giving firms the confidence to
market products that meet the standards.137  An open architecture can eliminate
market obstacles, provide for competition among vendors, and encourage new
third-party entrants.138  This can ensure more rapid adoption of the underlying
technologies and benefits for consumers.139  If designed appropriately, stan-
dards can protect investments in legacy infrastructure by ensuring compatibility
with older technologies as newer ones are deployed.140  By definition, however,
standards standardize, and they eliminate some opportunities for innovation.141
Standards could lead to suboptimal decisions if their establishment shuts out
tomorrow’s more advanced technologies142 or freezes out potential new firms.
Should we wait until ongoing Smart Grid projects yield valuable evidence
about what works and what does not?  With so many uncertainties, the risk of
proceeding without foundational standards outweighs other risks.143  Some stan-
dards can be flexible and account for future upgrades, mitigating the risk of
being stuck with outdated technologies.  Lessons learned from pilot projects
can yield valuable knowledge that can be incorporated into newer versions of
standards.144
1. Basic Concepts Behind Interoperability Standards
A “standard” includes “specifications that establish the fitness of a prod-
uct for a particular use or that define the function and performance of a device
or system.”145  Standards are technical documents that discuss requirements of
137 NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 26–27. R
138 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 21 (“Open standards can encourage a R
competitive, multi-supplier environment.”).
139 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 15–16; Chiao, Lerner, & Tirole, The Rules of R
Standard-setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis 2–3 (Ctr. For Economic Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 6141, 2007).
140 NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 26; see also Chiao et al., supra note 139, R
at 3 (“A standard that demands backwards compatibility can insure ongoing revenues for a legacy
product for many years.”).
141 Quinn & Reed, supra note 64, at 840 (noting that “regulatory decisions at this nascent R
stage of smart grid development will unavoidably widen some avenues of innovation while fore-
closing others”).
142 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 89 n.97 (“In theory, one could make the exact opposite R
argument, namely, that interoperability standards could impede progress in technology by forcing
a kind of lowest common denominator factor into interoperability standards, particularly in regard
to communications.”).
143 Werbach, supra note 11, at 211 (noting that “the greatest threat to market-driven innova- R
tion in convergence industries is not what is clearly prohibited, but what is uncertain”).
144 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 175 (“As the experiences with new Smart Grid R
technologies are gained from these projects, NIST will use these lessons learned to further identify
the gaps and shortcomings of applicable standards.”).
145 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 22. R
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minimum quality and the testing and certification of compliant products.146
They take many forms.  They may be normative (specifying “fully fledged im-
plementable standards or safety and security practices”), guiding (providing
“information on best practices”), or informative (providing “context and back-
ground information on Smart Grid technologies, practices and policies”).147
Interoperability standards are different from standards for one product.148
They are foundational to networks, specifying parameters of how actors and
components throughout the network interact with each other.149  Interoper-
ability’s fundamental attribute is the ability of users and devices to communi-
cate with each other transparently, without special effort.150  The familiar
“WiFi” standard (actually a part of a standard) is an excellent example of an
interoperability standard.  It specifies the foundation for wireless local area net-
work protocols, making it possible for a user to access these networks without
specifying the details of how her computer communicates with the network
system.151
To achieve interoperability in the Smart Grid, we are starting virtually
from scratch, with hundreds of standards needed,152 and no common under-
standing of foundational matters such as what types of data are gathered or how
they are exchanged.153  Talking about these matters is meaningless without
grounding them in a broader context.  It is impossible to talk about data without
knowing what we are trying to accomplish with that data.  Decisions about
interoperability, then, are related to fundamental regulatory decisions.
146 Technical standards are different from “performance standards,” such as those employed
in the environmental setting, that set goals and objectives for those regulated by them. See
Werbach, supra note 11, at 195; see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 272, 4301(a)(9) (West 2012) (defining R
“technical standards”).
147 SGIP, STANDARDS CATALOG 2 (2011), available at http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/
pub/SmartGrid/SGIPGBDocumentsUnderReview/Standards_Catalog_Process_and_Structure_
V0_9_20110401.pdf [hereinafter SGIP STANDARDS CATALOG] .
148 For a discussion of the impact of environmental product standards, see Noah Sachs, Can
We Regulate Our Way to Energy Efficiency? Product Standards as a Climate Change Policy, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1631 (2012).
149 Werbach, supra note 11, at 197. R
150 NIST defines “interoperability” as “[t]he capability of two or more networks, systems,
devices, applications, or components to exchange and readily use information — securely, effec-
tively, and with little or no inconvenience to the user.” NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 6. R
See generally GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 13–14 (discussing different R
levels and attributes of interoperability).
151 See IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee, IEEE 802, http://www.ieee802.org/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  Ethernet was first intro-
duced in 1980 as a result of collaboration among three companies building upon work in the
1970s by computer scientists. THE ETHERNET: A LOCAL AREA NETWORK 1 (1980), available at
http://ethernethistory.typepad.com/papers/EthernetSpec.pdf; Leiner et al., supra note 30.  This R
family of standards was standardized through the work of SDOs, including IEEE. Development of
Ethernet Standards, ETHERMANAGE.COM, http://www.ethermanage.com/ethernet/10quickref/
ch1qr_4.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
152 See NIST Framework 2.0, supra note 5, at 22. R
153 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of George Arnold), at 13 R
(“[I]nteroperability in the smart grid requires a common language of data models and identifiers
to enable communication across systems and applications.”).
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The technical challenges are daunting.  Even a common vocabulary is hard
to come by, as different technical disciplines use terms such as “reliability” in
different ways.  There is a spectrum of potential interaction among devices and
systems.  For example, two devices could be only physically connected, or have
the ability to exchange data, or coordinate operations based on complex com-
munication protocols and applications.154  The approach will be different at va-
rious locations on the Smart Grid.  At some points, the quality of interaction
might be loosely defined, but at others it might be tightly governed.155  The
technology to accomplish interactions (as in the case of DG) is often not fully
mature.  Integrating legacy utility infrastructure, which generally lacks stand-
ardization, complicates matters further.
2. Conceptual Models and “Use Cases”
The breathtaking complexity of achieving interoperability in the Smart
Grid is such that an agreed-upon vision of Smart Grid architecture is essential
simply to get started.  Tools such as semantic models,156 use cases, and concep-
tual models157 illustrate a wide range of interactions and serve as a foundation
for standards.  Choices made now, based on these models, are some of the most
important decisions that will ever be made about the Smart Grid.
154 GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 23–25.  The GWAC hierarchical con- R
ceptual model of different levels of interoperability, known colloquially as the “GWAC stack,” is
widely followed in Smart Grid standards development. NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at R
30.
155 Werbach, supra note 11, at 207 (Network standards play a “complicated role” and “a R
relatively lightweight standard at the interface between key layers of the network may allow for
great variety on either end.”).
156 ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., REPORT TO NIST ON THE SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY
STANDARDS ROADMAP vi (2009), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/Report_to_
NIST_August10_2.pdf [hereinafter EPRI NIST REPORT]  (noting that a common semantic model
for information is a high priority for the Smart Grid).
157 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 38–42 (describing the NIST conceptual model of R
the Smart Grid).
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FIGURE 1: NIST CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR SMART GRID158
“Use cases,” as the name suggests, are narrative descriptions of how ac-
tors will interact in (“use”) the Smart Grid.  A standard would enable these
uses by specifying the required technical content.  The SAE International
(“SAE”) standard J2836 for “vehicle-to-grid” connections159 specifies five dif-
ferent scenarios under which a vehicle owner could connect to the electrical
grid to obtain power, or, possibly, provide power back from her battery to it.
Under the use “U2,” for example, a vehicle battery is used in a utility’s direct
load control program.160
158 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 35. R
159 See generally SAE INT’L, USE CASES FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PLUG-IN VEHICLES
AND THE UTILITY GRID (2010), available at http://standards.sae.org/j2836/1_201004/.
160 See THEODORE BOHN, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CHALLENGES OF THE COMING ELECTRIC
CAR REVOLUTION 34 (2011), available at http://www.ilmua.org/AnnualMeeting/Annual%20Meet-
ing%202011_Bohn.pdf.
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FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF A “USE CASE” 161
Some caution is in order, as the apparent comprehensiveness of a set of
use cases may be illusory if some known interactions are excluded.162  Also, if
today’s Smart Grid is like the Internet of 1995, we cannot foresee all future new
uses.  Someone will come along at a later date and draw new lines, squiggles,
or 3-D connections on a conceptual model, making connections previously
thought impossible.  However, we have to have some common frame of refer-
ence, which the use cases and conceptual models provide.
B. How Standards Are Set
A use case is descriptive, not normative.  It identifies specific interactions
that can take place across the Smart Grid, but does not prescribe how they
happen.  That leaves an important issue unsettled: who sets the standards’ con-
tent? There is no obvious answer.  We are defining what it is while we are
doing it, and could make big and expensive mistakes early and often.
161 A use case is a graphical representation of the inputs, processes, outputs and
responsibilities of actors in the system for demand response. See EPRI NIST REPORT, supra note
156, at 55. R
162 See Chuck Goldman & Rogery Levy, Engaging the Customer, LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT’L LAB., SMART GRID TECHNICAL ADVISORY PROJECT (2009), available at http://collaborate.
nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/PAP10EnergyUsagetoEMS (download from icon
“NARUC-Webinar2-Dec16-FinalDraft-121609.ppt”) (detailing possible problems with use cases).
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With hundreds of standards to be set, a regularized process is necessary to
avoid uncertainty.163  Where we start, and how we proceed, are extremely im-
portant decisions.
1. The Norm: Standard-setting By Private Sector Experts (Standards
Development Organizations)
There is a strong preference in the United States for “bottom up,”164 par-
ticipant-driven, private sector standard-setting processes.  Many different types
of groups develop standards, including formal organizations with rigorous pro-
cedures, industry consortia, and other actors.165  A standard can also evolve
without any action if a technology becomes so prevalent that it becomes the de
facto standard.166
Formal “standards development organizations” (“SDOs”) such as the
IEEE and SAE have decades of expertise in developing voluntary consensus
standards.  “Consensus” refers both to the process of developing standards, and
to the acceptance of certified products in the marketplace.  A manufacturer de-
siring to produce a specific grade of steel, for example, will refer to a standard
set by the ASTM for the content of specific ingredients and the production
process to guarantee quality.
This type of standards organization is well known to utilities and other
Smart Grid participants.167  Major SDOs already have standards in place for
some important Smart Grid technologies. One notable example is the IEEE 802
family of standards, which includes the foundation for the familiar “WiFi”
wireless local area network protocols, among others.168  SDOs are developing
standards, often in competition with one another, which they intend to become
part of the Smart Grid.169  These standards vary in their availability and matur-
ity.170  Some existing standards have been modified for the Smart Grid by ad-
dressing new issues.  However, some either exist only in draft form, or would
be new and developed specifically for the Smart Grid.171
163 NIST SGIP, SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY PANEL STANDARDS 6 (2010), available at
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/SGIP%20Update_2010_NARUC%20Summer_v81.
pdf (noting that “[c]onsistent action will influence the vendor community”).
164 NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4. R
165 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 22. R
166 Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 35, 49
(2007).
167 Id. at 42 (noting that “standards development organizations are exceedingly credible and
common to all industries that rely on standards”).
168 See IEEE 802, supra note 151; see also Leiner et al., supra note 30.  The WiFi family of R
standards was standardized through the work of SDOs, including IEEE.  ETHERMANAGE.COM,
supra note 151. R
169 See PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., HOME AREA NETWORKS AND THE SMART GRID 1 (2011)  (not-
ing that “[t]here are myriad standards and protocols vying for dominance in the smart grid
market”).
170 Opening Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 3. R
171 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\37-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 30  1-APR-13 11:11
30 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 37
SDOs are indispensable to developing interoperability standards.172  Par-
ticipants’ experience with them also creates a strong expectation about how
standards are set.  SDOs have formal participatory “processes marked by open-
ness, balance, transparency, and characterized by due processes to address neg-
ative comments.”173  They typically involve their industry members in
committees to draft new standards and submit them to the membership for ap-
proval.174  This can be as complex as the workings of any legislature, with rules
governing the composition of committees, voting procedures, and other mat-
ters.  As a result, SDOs are generally “perceived to provide a more effective
‘stamp of approval’ than special interest groups dominated by technology
sponsors.”175
The American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) is the designated
national standards body,176 and itself an SDO that accredits other SDOs.  Under
its “Procedures for the Development and Coordination of American National
Standards,”177 the ANSI seeks “to verify that the principles of openness and
due process have been followed and that a consensus of all interested parties
has been reached.”178  The threshold for developing a standard is “sufficient
evidence that the standard has a substantive reasonable basis for its existence
and that it meets the needs of producers, users and other interest groups.”179
The SDO must follow procedures designed to ensure that the standard is a
product of a consensus judgment that subordinates any one stakeholder’s nar-
row economic interest.180  These include requirements that the SDO have bal-
anced representation from interested parties, that votes cannot be dominated or
manipulated by those with economic interests or other influence, and that dis-
satisfied parties may appeal adverse decisions.181  An important ANSI-accred-
ited SDO that sets standards for utilities is the North American Energy
Standards Board (“NAESB”).182  NAESB was expanded from a predecessor
172 The EISA recognizes this by directing NIST to work with specified SDOs. See EPRI
NIST REPORT, supra note 156, at vi. R
173 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 45. R
174 See Membership, ASTM INT’L, http://www.astm.org/MEMBERSHIP/standardsdevelop.
html (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
175 Chiao et al., supra note 139, at 3. R




178 Amy A. Marasco, Standards Development: Are You at Risk?, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS
INST., http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/other_documents/risk.aspx?menuid=7 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
179 Id.
180 EPRI NIST REPORT, supra note 156, at 10. R
181 See Marasco, supra note 178; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 65 (noting the line R
of Supreme Court cases that “emphasize[s] that industry standards must be developed and admin-
istered objectively, and not by a company or group that has a vested interest in an exclusionary
outcome”).
182 See About NAESB, N. AM. ENERGY STANDARDS BD. http://www.naesb.org/aboutus.asp
(last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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organization in 2002 to develop standards for the wholesale gas and electric
markets.183
The pluralistic ideal of SDO democratic engagement can break down in
practice if companies co-opt the process by embedding content in standards
that favors their interests.184  This concern has led to criticism of SDO standard-
setting as regulation outsourced to the private sector without appropriate
checks,185 and discussion about the antitrust impacts of potential competitors
uniting to define and dominate an industry.186  However, there is a strong pref-
erence in federal law for private standards development.  The ANSI’s “United
States Standards Strategy” states that “[v]oluntary consensus standards are at
the foundation of the U.S. economy.”187  The National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act (“NTTAA”) requires federal agencies to “use technical
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bod-
ies.”188 OMB Circular A-119 elaborates the definitions and requirements for
voluntary consensus standards.189
2. An Alternative Form of Standard-setting: Crowdsourcing (Internet
Standards)
An alternative standard-setting model is the highly decentralized structure
for setting the Internet’s technical standards.  The main Internet standards orga-
nizations are the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”)190 and World Wide
183 See Letter from Jonathan Booe, Deputy Director, NAESB, to Dr. Patrick Gallagher, Direc-
tor, NIST (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), available at http://
www.nist.gov/standardsgov/upload/NAESB.pdf; William P. Boswell & James P. Cargas, North
American Energy Standards Board: Legal and Administrative Underpinnings of a Consensus
Based Organization, 27 ENERGY L.J. 147 (2006) (discussing the NAESB’s creation).  FERC incor-
porates by reference NAESB business practice standards for the wholesale power system. See,
e.g., Incorporation by Reference of North American Energy Standards Board Wholesale Electric
Quadrant Standards, 18 C.F.R. § 38.2 (2010); FERC, Standards for Business Practices of Inter-
state Natural Gas Pipelines, RM96-1-036, 140 FERC ¶ 61,036 (July 19, 2012).
184 Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 406-11
(2003) (discussing potential for individual actors’ dominance of private SDOs); Chiao et al., supra
note 139, at 6 (noting that standard-setting can involve a “war of attrition” in which “vested R
interests” delay a standard). See generally Tyler R.T. Wolf, Existing in a Legal Limbo: The Pre-
carious Legal Position of Standards-Development Organizations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807
(2008) (discussing this issue and more alleged defects of the SDO process).
185 See generally Shapiro, supra note 184. R
186 Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV.
1041 (1996) (discussing antitrust concerns and private standards organizations); see also Stan-
dards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661
(2004).
187 Baird, supra note 166, at 55-56. R
188 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 12,
110 Stat. 775 (1996).
189 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-
119, REVISED FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSEN-
SUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR]
§ 4(a)(1)(v) (1998), available at http://standards.gov/a119.cfm.
190 See PAUL HOFFMAN, THE TAO OF IETF: A NOVICE’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET ENGINEER-
ING TASK FORCE 1 (2012), available at http://tools.ietf.org/rfcmarkup?doc=fyi17.
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Web Consortium (“W3C”).191  Neither relies on any government agency to ad-
minister standards.  W3C membership is open to anyone, and the W3C pro-
cess192 is designed to produce standards that “maximize consensus” and “earn
endorsement by W3C and the broader community.”193
The IETF’s “radically decentralized and open structure”194 allows for the
broadest exchange of views on standards, but it is doubtful that it is a good
model for the Smart Grid.  As one observer notes, the IETF is “rare in its
ability to function so effectively” despite being  fully decentralized.195  This has
led at least one observer to conclude that the Internet crowdsourcing model is
not a realistic one for the Smart Grid.196
Internet standards, however, will be important in the Smart Grid,197 and
one cherished aspect of these standards is well worth emulating.  A standard is
“open” if a Fortune 500 company as well as a teenager in a garage in Califor-
nia can readily access it, design around it, and build new products.  Internet
standards are open and freely available,198 and those of the Smart Grid should
be as well.
C. Reasons to Depart from the Norm: Federal Standard-setting
Involvement for the Smart Grid
Private standard-setting may be the norm, but the difficulties of achieving
any progress in developing Smart Grid interoperability standards seem insuper-
able unless the federal government is involved.199  With Smart Grid rollouts
191 See WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (stating that “[t]he World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) is an international community that develops open standards to ensure the long-term growth
of the Web”).
192 WC3 Process Document, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/2005/10/
Process-20051014/tr (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
193 Standards, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/standards/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
194 Werbach, supra note 11, at 199. R
195 Id.
196 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Andrew Wright), at 57 R
(stating that “[t]he most farthest-reaching [sic] imaginative thing would be to create a new stan-
dards organizations [sic], something like the IETF. That’s probably unrealistic”).
197 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 48–49 (discussing the IETF’s “RFC 6272 Internet R
Protocols for the Smart Grid” that “provide[ ] Smart Grid designers with guidance on how to use
the Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) in the Smart Grid [and] provide[ ] an overview of the IPS and
the key infrastructure protocols that are critical in integrating Smart Grid devices into an IP-based
infrastructure”).
198 FERC TECHNICAL CONFERENCE 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Andrew Wright), at 41 R
(noting with respect to the first Smart Grid standards that “[t]he standards under consideration are
open, in the sense that anyone can gain access to the standard, but they are not nearly as open or
freely accessed as the IETF and W3C standards that can be downloaded free of cost and restric-
tions from many websites”).
199 See Baird, supra note 166, at 38 (noting that “[t]he high demand for interoperability is in R
turn creating an environment wherein stakeholders are more likely to turn to government to inter-
vene in the market to aid in achieving particular goals more rapidly than may occur in the natural
course of market activity”).
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underway, many believe that standards will not be in place quickly enough if
left to the market.
1. The Smart Grid’s Massive Scope and Complexity
The first reason to depart from the norm is the enormous scope of the
Smart Grid, involving thousands of stakeholders200 and hundreds of standards
that must be developed all at once.  This requires a different standard-setting
process201 due to a lack of resources and coordination difficulties.202  A typical
technical standard can take years to develop.203  The Ethernet standard for wired
computer networking took ten years to ripen into a standard, and even longer to
evolve into the more robust networking standard in wide use today.204  Multiply
that by hundreds, and one begins to see the extraordinary breadth of the task.
The number of standards and prospect of delay are hardly the only con-
cerns.  Many SDOs have little to no experience with the electric utility indus-
try,205 or with the impacts of their decisions on the electric grid.  A recurring
issue is the bridging of functionality across SDOs’ respective areas of engage-
ment.  Setting Smart Grid standards often entails an “[a]nalysis of cross-func-
tional area applications requiring coordination between one or more
technologies beyond the original scope of the technology itself.”206  Vehicle-to-
grid connections, for example, involve organizations developing electrical and
automotive standards.  These SDOs usually lack experience working with each
other and coordinating their efforts will be difficult at best.207
2. Federal Involvement is Necessary to Ensure Grid Reliability and
Cybersecurity
There are other reasons that innovation will be suboptimal without federal
involvement.  The electric grid has to work continuously, so some entity must
be responsible for assuring reliability and that standards allow new devices to
200 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 34 (noting the involvement of “thousands of R
companies” that may build products for the Smart Grid).
201 EPRI NIST REPORT, supra note 156, at 18 (noting that “[t]he large number of stakehold- R
ers, different considerations, [and] number and complexity of standards available (and missing)
requires a more formal nationally-driven governance structure”).
202 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Wayne Longcore), at R
124–26.
203 PETER FOX-PENNER, supra note 4, at 61 (standards groups “convene committees of engi- R
neers who wrangle, often for years, over a standard”); Chiao et al., supra note 139, at 3 (noting R
the “frequently ponderous pace at which traditional standards development organizations move”).
204 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Ed Beroset), at 59. R
205 See Smart Grid Standards Adoption: Staff Update and Recommendations, FERC, slide 4
(Jul. 15, 2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/07-15-10-smart-grid.pdf (not-
ing that standards setting in the SGIP involves “a broad range of stakeholders, many of whom
have not previously been involved in the electric industry”).
206 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 130. R
207 See Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, 31 ENERGY L.J. 81, 91
(2009) (attributing to NIST Administrator George Arnold the observation that getting SDOs to
work together is like “herding cats”).
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work with utilities’ legacy equipment.  The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (“NERC”), certified by FERC as the “Electric Reliability Organi-
zation,”208 plays an important role in this process.  NERC conducts reliability
assessments and enforces mandatory standards to ensure the reliability of the
wholesale power system, in accordance with Section 215 of the Federal Power
Act.209  NERC views it as critical that interoperability standards for the Smart
Grid work with its reliability standards.210  This integration would be too diffi-
cult to leave to any one SDO.
Another worrisome issue is cybersecurity, which has emerged as a major
Smart Grid concern.211  Increasing the points of interaction on the grid212 and
exchanging more information than before can lead to vulnerabilities.  A 2012
report by the Department of Energy’s Inspector General found that 36% of
Smart Grid projects receiving federal funds did not adequately discuss these
risks,213 and a sweeping 2011 report from the Government Accountability Of-
fice (“GAO”) criticized progress on cybersecurity.214  One key GAO finding is
that no one entity oversees the entire grid to ensure that systems interoperate in
a secure manner.  The issue of institutional responsibilities for cybersecurity is
important, and the subject of many ongoing discussions.215  This and other na-
208 N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
209 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824o(a)(2), (c)(1) (West 2012).  Under this section, FERC approves relia-
bility standards that NERC develops and submits to it.
210 N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., COMMENTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRICY REL-
LIABILITY CORPORATION ON NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR SMART GRID INTEROPER-
ABILITY STANDARDS, RELEASE 1.0 (DRAFT) 7–8 (Nov. 9, 2009) available at http://www.nerc.com/
docs/pc/sgtf/FinalNERCCommentsNIST_Smart_Grid_Framework_Document.pdf.
211 See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP: SMART GRIDS 32 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/smartgrids_roadmap.pdf
(“The introduction of information technologies in the smart grid introduces new cyber vulnerabili-
ties that must be protected against by the rigorous application of cyber security standards.”);
Lance Witney, Billions to be Spent on Smart-Grid Cybersecurity, CNET (Feb. 4, 2010), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10447430-83.html.
212 See Marsha W. Johnston, Smart Grid Initiatives Address Cyber Security, Renewable En-
ergy Intermittency, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.renewableenergy
world.com/rea/news/article/2012/01/smart-grid-initiatives-address-cyber-security-renewable-en-
ergy-intermittency (noting that renewable energy systems can be owned by consumers, not utili-
ties, and therefore may pose cybersecurity risks).
213 U.S. Smart Grid Projects Failing on Security, INFO. AGE (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.
information-age.com/channels/information-management/news/1687918/us-smart-grid-projects-
failing-on-security.thtml.
214 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 22–25 (identifying six chal- R
lenges to smart grid cybersecurity).
215 See NIST, GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 1, SMART GRID CYBER
SECURITY STRATEGY, ARCHITECTURE, AND HIGH-LEVEL REQUIREMENT (2010), available at http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7628/nistir-7628_vol1.pdf; NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, R
at 126 (noting that NISTIR 7628 requires that “standards . . . undergo a thorough cybersecurity
review”); TOM BAUMEISTER, LITERATURE REVIEW ON SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY (2010),
available at http://server.wattdepot.org/techreports/10-11/10-11.pdf (reviewing the literature on
many subissues relating to cybersecurity).  In September 2012, FERC created an “Office of En-
ergy Infrastructure Security” to coordinate its cybsersecurity efforts. See New FERC Office to
Focus on Cyber Security, FERC (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2012/
2012-3/09-20-12.asp.
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tional concerns are too critical to be left to a single SDO.  Nor does any one
SDO have the ability to ensure that standards currently under development in
Europe and China are harmonized with American standards.216
3. Federal Involvement is Necessary to Provide Guidance to States
and Overcome Federalism Barriers
A final and important reason to have a federally-led standard-setting pro-
cess is the involvement of state PUCs.  As noted above, states, not the market,
have the ultimate authority to determine whether to approve standards in
projects affecting the distribution system.217  They will look to standards devel-
opment processes for guidance.218  For the foreseeable future, they are the deci-
sion makers, and, given their pivotal role, they either have to be involved in the
standard-setting process or have confidence in its outcome.  Utilities need to
know whether PUCs will support the process.  It would be wasteful for utilities
to commit their resources to a national process, and then have to face duplica-
tive technical evaluations in state proceedings.
Yet it would be inappropriate to expect the states themselves to lead the
standards development process.  Many PUCs have limited staffs and lack the
necessary technical expertise.219  Having 51 different points of approval may
lead to balkanization, in which states choose different technologies and stan-
dards, and uniformity suffers.220  Companies seeking to participate in regional
or national projects would face the excessive transaction costs of multiple
approvals.
216 See NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 32–34 for a discussion of ongoing activities to R
“harmonize” standards at the international level.
217 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 19 (“[S]tate regulatory R
bodies and other regulators with authority over the distribution system will play a key role in
overseeing the extent to which interoperability and cybersecurity standards are followed since
many smart grid upgrades will be installed on the distribution system.”); N.Y. PUB. SERV.
COMM’N, supra note 23, at 60 (stating that “we conclude that the states are free to act within their R
jurisdiction on the standards, without specific federal statutory direction or constraint”).
218 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 61 (“We will look to the standards R
as a guide in our review of project proposals, and utilities should use them as a reference case of
best practices.”); FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Andy Bochman), R
at 98 (noting “there is a distinct possibility that state public utility commissions and other regula-
tory organizations might quickly promote [adopted standards] to fill what they see as a significant
void in guidance”).
219 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 20 (noting with respect to PUCs R
that “limited resources and technical expertise made their roles in overseeing interoperability and
cybersecurity, including participating in the NIST standards process, more challenging”).
220 See, e.g., Quinn and Reed, supra note 64, at 881–82; Margaret Ryan, Grid Week Analysis: R
Smart Grid Losing to EPA, AOLENERGY (Sep.  19, 2011), http://energy.aol.com/2011/09/19/
gridweek-analysis-smart-grid-losing-to-epa/ (noting that this leaves the industry having to deal
with “51 bar fights”).
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D. The National Governance Structure Established and in Place for Smart
Grid Standards Development
The federal government’s overriding national interests require it to oversee
the Smart Grid standards-setting effort.221  The model of government as catalyst
is an appropriate one for the Smart Grid,222 as the federal government has previ-
ously been a “public sector partner” and a “convener” in other standards de-
velopment efforts.223  The federal role is to coordinate the effort, ensure that
national issues are addressed properly, and leverage SDOs’ efforts.  In the
Smart Grid, utilities and PUCs would expect to be involved in the standards
process, as would other stakeholders.  In particular, PUCs need to be reassured
that the federal convening process does not compromise their long-standing
authority to approve utilities’ projects at the distribution level.  Designing a
standard-setting regime that overcomes any possible reluctance or resistance on
the part of states requires their involvement in the process.
Displacing SDOs from their traditional role as the basic standard-setting
entities would be inapt.  No federal agency has the technical expertise to set
Smart Grid standards, so it is important to take advantage of existing standards
and SDOs’ expertise.  Relying on SDOs as primary standard setters would not
run afoul of the doctrine “prohibiting delegations of social policymaking au-
thority to private groups,” as Professor Michael Froomkin puts it in his criti-
cism of the process for assignment of Internet domain names.224  Froomkin
notes, “[t]hat doctrine is not violated when the government relies on private
groups to set technical standards.”225
1. The NIST-led Process (Smart Grid Interoperability Panel)
The EISA226 addressed standards development in its Title XIII, which es-
tablished a national framework for Smart Grid development and began with a
221 Opening Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 7. R
222 See id.; EPRI NIST Report, supra note 156, at 12, 18. R
223 NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 4; Aneesh Chopra and Patrick Gallagher, R
Public-Private Standards Efforts to Make America Strong (January 31, 2012), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/31/public-private-standards-efforts-make-america-strong; Aneesh
Chopra, Miriam Sopiro, Cass Sunstein, Principles for Federal Engagement in Standards Activities
to Address National Priorities, OFFICE OF SCI. TECH. & POL., at 3 (Jan 17, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2012/m-12-08_1.pdf (“Agencies
considering a convening or active engagement role in private sector standards developing organi-
zations in order to address a national priority area should state their reasons plainly [including
why private sector leadership alone is insufficient].”).
224 See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the
APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 170 (2000).
225 See, e.g., id.; Boswell and Cargas, supra note 183, at 158-63 (noting that the creation of R
the NAESB was a “subdelegation” of this sort that would pass Constitutional muster, discussing
relevant cases and noting that FERC did not delegate regulatory authority to the NAESB).
226 See, e.g., Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and Environ-
mental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 382 (2011). The EISA is one of the omnibus energy
acts in which Congress periodically reacts to a panoply of contemporary issues, leading to a
fragmented body of energy law with “lots of pieces but no overall picture.”  Its many provisions
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statement that it is the “policy of the United States to support the moderniza-
tion of the Nation’s electricity transmission and distribution system.”227  The
statute enumerated the over ten objectives described above.  It created a Smart
Grid Advisory Committee and Smart Grid Task Force to advise the DOE, and
gave the DOE the responsibility to establish a Smart Grid Investment Matching
Grant Program for qualifying projects.228
EISA Section 1305 gave NIST “primary responsibility to coordinate the
development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for
information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and
systems.”229  This section directed NIST to seek input and collaborate with
FERC, the new Smart Grid entities, SDOs (including IEEE and the National
Electrical Manufacturers Association), NERC, and the GridWise Architecture
Council.230  NIST was directed to create flexible, uniform, and technology neu-
tral standards and enable traditional resources, distributed resources, renew-
ables, storage, efficiency, and demand response to contribute to an efficient,
reliable grid.231
Congress intended that FERC take an active review role,232 given its ex-
pertise and statutory mandates to regulate the grid.  Once FERC finds that
NIST has developed a “sufficient consensus” on standards, it must institute a
rulemaking proceeding to “adopt” standards it deems necessary “to insure
smart-grid functionality and interoperability in the interstate transmission of
electric power, and regional and wholesale electricity markets.”233  “Sufficient
consensus” is therefore a threshold determination.234  Critically, the EISA did
not give FERC any new powers to enforce any standards it might adopt, be-
yond its existing FPA authorities to regulate interstate transmission of electric-
ity.  Its role is limited to ensuring the standards’ functionality.
Congress created this two-step process because both agencies have exper-
tise, but neither could handle the task alone.  NIST has no regulatory role, and
as the grid’s regulator, FERC would benefit from NIST’s technical expertise.235
It was apparent that this would be an ongoing relationship, as hundreds of stan-
encourage fossil fuel development, renewable energy, and energy efficiency. FRED SISSINE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007: A SUMMARY OF
MAJOR PROVISIONS (2007), available at http://www.seco.noaa.gov/Energy/2007_Dec_21_Sum-
mary_Security_Act_2007.pdf.
227 42 U.S.C.A. § 17381 (West 2012).
228 42 U.S.C.A. § 17386 (West 2012).
229 42 U.S.C.A. § 17385(a) (West 2012).
230 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 17385(a)(1)–(2).
231 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17385(b).
232 JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN
NETWORK INDUSTRIES: SMART GRID INNOVATION: POLICY, POLITICS, AND LAW 9 (2011), available
at www.crninet.com/2011/d14c.pdf.  NIST does not have expertise in keeping the electric grid
running.  FERC does.  It and it alone can evaluate “problems concerning cybersecurity, changes
associated with our nation’s generation mix including reliance on intermittent renewable re-
sources, and problems that may arise with the development of electric and hybrid vehicles.” Id.
233 42 U.S.C.A. § 17385(d).
234 FERC, supra note 205, at slide 7 (“[Consensus] is really the first threshold determination R
that this Commission needs to make under the statute.”).
235 Werbach, supra note 11, at 202. R
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dards would not be set overnight.  Time, of course, was of the essence.  The
ARRA’s enactment in 2009 lent a sense of urgency to the standards develop-
ment effort and put pressure on the two agencies to define the contours of their
relationship quickly.
Some standards were needed sooner than others.236  The first source of
priorities was the FERC “Smart Grid Policy Statement,” a comprehensive pri-
mer that (among other things) set forth FERC’s position on near-term standards
development.237  FERC recommended a focus on key functions (wide-area situ-
ational awareness, demand response and consumer energy efficiency, energy
storage, and electric transportation), cybersecurity, and network communica-
tions.238  NIST accepted these priorities and added two of its own: advanced
metering and distribution grid management.239
NIST devised a three-phase plan to “rapidly identify an initial set of stan-
dards, while providing a robust process for continued development and imple-
mentation of standards as needs and opportunities arise and as technology
advances.”240  This began with a public outreach effort to “identify applicable
standards and requirements, gaps in currently available standards, and priorities
for additional standardization activities.”241  In an extraordinary undertaking
perhaps unprecedented in the history of standards development, it held three
public workshops in 2009, involving more than 1,500 participants and hundreds
of organizations.242
Utility participants were a minority of those in attendance, and one ob-
server wondered if being “severely underrepresented as the process moves to
the various standards development organizations” would leave utilities with
“little say over the final standards as they are developed without [their] signifi-
cant input.”243  That theme would recur later.
NIST’s contractor’s report called for a “Smart Grid Panel and governance
process to identify and guide the development of smart grid standards.”244  In
236 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 22. R
237 Frisby, Jr. & Trotta, supra note 73, at 309.  One paragraph of the Smart Grid Policy State- R
ment deserves special mention.  FERC interpreted the EISA term “adopt” to give it “the authority
to adopt a standard that will be applicable to all electric power facilities and devices with smart
grid features, including those at the local distribution level and those used directly by retail cus-
tomers so long as the standard is necessary for the purpose” of the EISA. FERC SMART GRID
POLICY, supra note 23, ¶ 22.  FERC claimed that EISA section 1305(d) does not exclude facilities R
used in local distribution or otherwise limit FERC authority to approve standards.  State PUCs
subsequently interpreted that statement as throwing down the jurisdictional gauntlet, viewing it as
unwarranted interference with their authority to implement standards in their approval proceedings
for distribution-level projects. See infra notes 321–346 and accompanying text. R
238 FERC SMART GRID POLICY, supra note 23, ¶ 29. R
239 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 8. R
240 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 15. R
241 Id.
242 See, e.g., Third Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Interim Roadmap Public Workshop,
74 Fed. Reg. 36,672 (July 24, 2009) (notice of Washington, DC workshop).
243 David Owens, Time to Speak Up! Get Involved Developing Smart Grid Standards, IEEE
POWER & ENERGY MAG. 87 (Mar.-Apr. 2010) available at http://www.ieee.org/portal/cms_docs_
pes/pes/subpages/bullseye-folder/March10/March-IMV.pdf.
244 EPRI NIST REPORT, supra note 156, at 19. R
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November 2009, NIST created the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (“SGIP”)
to serve this function.  The SGIP does not directly develop or write standards,245
but instead participates in and coordinates their development.246  It has nearly
2000 members representing over 780 organizations.247  Its structure consists of
a 25-member Governing Board (which sets priorities for the SGIP’s work), Pro-
gram Management Office, standing committees, “domain expert working
groups” (“DEWGs”) that provide expert technical advice,248 and “Priority Ac-
tion Plans” (“PAPs”).249  The SGIP Governing Board strives for balance, with
elected representatives from all twenty-two stakeholder categories.250  As NIST
Administrator Arnold puts it, the fact that many stakeholders object to this
demonstrates that the Board is balanced.251  Reflecting the importance of cyber-
security, the SGIP “has established one permanent working group, the Cyber-
security Working Group (“CSWG”),”252 charged with reviewing standards to
determine whether they meet appropriate security requirements.  Unanimity of
members is not required to approve a standard.  Approval consists of two steps:
245 SGIP, SGIPGB AND SGIP CHARTER 3 (2012) [hereinafter SGIP BYLAWS AND CHARTER]
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The SGIP is structurally similar to the Healthcare
Information Technology Standards Panel. Id. at iii; see also Baird, supra note 166, at 73–75 R
(describing this panel and declaring it an important and necessary departure from private standard-
setting).
246 Introduction to the NIST Smart Grid Collaboration Wiki, NIST SGIP, http://collaborate.
nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/SGIPAbout (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
247 Welcome to the NIST Smart Grid Collaboration Wiki, What is the Smart Grid Interoper-
ability Panel?, NIST SGIP, http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/Web
Home#What_is_the_Smart_Grid_Interoper (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).  Another organization that provides input to NIST is the Smart Grid Federal
Advisory Committee, begun in September 2010, that consists of 15 experts from industry,
academia, and trade associations.  NIST Smart Grid Advisory Committee, NIST, http://www.nist.
gov/smartgrid/committee.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
248 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 16, 160; Domain Expert Working Groups, R
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, http://www.gridwiseac.org/about/dewg.aspx (last visited Jan.
22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (discussing formation of DEWGs in
conjunction with the GridWise Architecture Council); CARVALLO & COOPER, supra note 2, at 163. R
Current DEWGs include Transmission and Distribution, Home-to-Grid, Building-to-Grid, Indus-
try-to-Grid, PEV-to-Grid, Business and Policy, and Distributed Renewables, Generation and Stor-
age. Domain Expert Working Groups (Analysis), Current DEWGs within the SSGP, NIST SGIP,
http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/DEWGs (last visited Jan. 22, 2013)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
249 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 136, 160. R
250 SGIP BYLAWS AND CHARTER, supra note 245, at 5–6; NIST Smart Grid Collaboration R
Wiki, SGIP Leadership, NIST SGIP, http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/
WebHome#SGIP_Leadership (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
251 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of George Arnold), at 12 R
(noting that utilities claim they are underrepresented while others claim the Board “is dominated
by the utilities,” so “[t]his is probably an indication that we have struck a reasonable balance”).
252 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 130. R
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a Governing Board recommendation and a vote by the SGIP members, with
both votes requiring 75% in favor of approval.253
FIGURE 3: SGIP TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES254
Name of Committee or 
Working Group
Purpose or Mandate Notes
Smart Grid Architecture 
Committee (“SGAC”)
Maintains a conceptual 
reference model for the 
Smart Grid; develops high-
level architectural principles 
and requirements
Smart Grid Testing and 
Certification Committee 
(“SGTCC”)
Creates and maintains a 
framework for compliance, 
interoperability and 
cybersecurity testing and 
certification for 
recommended Smart Grid 
standards.
Cyber Security Working 
Group (“CSWG”)
Identifies and analyzes 
security requirements and 
develops a risk mitigation 
strategy to ensure the 
security and integrity of the 
Smart Grid. 
Priority Action Plans 
(“PAPs”)
Addresses specific 
standards-related gaps and 
issues for which resolution is 
most urgently needed.
Currently totaling 16 PAPs; 
more will be added as 
necessary.
Domain Expert Working 
Groups (“DEWGs”)
Perform analyses and 
provide expertise in specific 
application domains.
Seven current DEWGs are: 
Transmission and 
Distribution; Building to 
Grid; Industry to Grid;
Home to Grid; Business and 
Policy; Vehicle to Grid;
Distributed Renewables, 
Generation, and Storage
A “PAP” is NIST’s term for a focused SGIP effort to “coordinate . . .
resolving urgent standards issues.”255  The SGIP PAP leadership team identifies
a standards organization to lead the effort and produce a standard, which must
253 SGIP BYLAWS AND CHARTER, supra note 245, at 23 (“Seventy-five percent (75%) of the R
quorum must approve a technical measure for it to pass.”); SGIP STANDARDS CATALOG, supra
note 147, at 5 (requiring 75% votes of both to approve a standard for the Catalog of Standards). R
254 Welcome to the NIST Smart Grid Collaboration Wiki, SGIP Site, NIST SGIP, http://
collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/WebHome (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
255 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 64. R
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then go through the approval process.  Any organization assuming this respon-
sibility must have a “robust consensus process” meeting the principles of OMB
Circular A119 and the NTTAA.256  SGIP works to “facilitate this process, en-
sure that all PAP materials are publicly available to the extent possible as they
are developed on the NIST Smart Grid Collaboration Site, and provide gui-
dance as needed when significant differences among the participants in the PAP
occur, or there is uncertainty about the PAP goals.”257  In the spirit of openness
and transparency, each PAP has a collaborative wiki page to engage
stakeholders.258
In 2010, after its preparatory efforts, NIST issued a “Framework and
Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0” (“Frame-
work”).259  The Framework identified seventy-five existing standards applicable
(or likely to be applicable) to the Smart Grid.  Of these, twenty-five were iden-
tified as having “strong stakeholder consensus,” even though they might re-
quire modifications or further development, and the rest were marked “for
further review.”260  An example of the first group is the ZigBee Alliance’s
“Smart Energy Profile” 2.0 (“SEP 2.0”) specification for home area network
communications.261
There was, and is, much work to be done.  The Framework specified 15
high-priority gaps, harmonization issues (in addition to cybersecurity) and
PAPs to address important near-term concerns.262  It described a high-level
“conceptual reference model” for the Smart Grid that is “meant to foster un-
derstanding of Smart Grid operational intricacies but not meant to prescribe
how a particular stakeholder will implement the Smart Grid.”  The NIST con-
ceptual model maps the Smart Grid’s “system of systems,”263 identifying “do-
256 Opening remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 6. R
257 NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 64. R
258 For example, NIST’s website for PAP10, “Standard Energy Usage Information,” details
the extensive work that went into the development of the standard, with numerous webinars and
open meetings, and outreach activities to other standards organizations. NIST Smart Grid Collab-
oration Wiki, PAP10: Standard Energy Usage Information, NIST SGIP, http://collaborate.nist.
gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/PAP10EnergyUsagetoEMS (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library); see infra notes 269–285 and accompanying text. R
259 See generally NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1. R
260 Id. at 61.  The list of standards is set forth at pages 50–60.
261 Id. at 7.  The Smart Energy Profile specification was listed in the set of twenty-five Frame-
work standards. See id. at 57.  This specification provides a set of functionality for home area
networks designed to meet the requirements established in the OpenHAN specification of the
Utility Communications Architecture International Users Group, which itself was included as a
Framework standard. See UCA INT’L USERS GRP., UTILITY AMI 2008 HOME AREA NETWORK
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION (2008), available at http://osgug.ucaiug.org/sgstore/
Shared%20Documents/UtilityAMI%20HAN%20SRS%20-%20v1.04%20-%20080819-1.pdf;
NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 57–58; see also SGIP, PAP 18: SEP 1.X TO SEP 2.0 R
TRANSITION AND COEXISTENCE GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES (2011) (detailing how utilities
that installed smart meters meeting earlier versions of SEP can transition to version 2.0 when it is
complete).
262 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 7. R
263 IEEE: The Expertise to Make Smart Grid a Reality, IEEE SMART GRID, http://smartgrid.
ieee.org/ieee-smart-grid/smart-grid-conceptual-model (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
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mains” (for example, the “Customer” domain) and potential paths of
information flow among them, but not specifying how interactions take
place.264  The Framework also described the strategy to help ensure Smart Grid
cybersecurity.  An updated version 2.0 of the Framework was released for com-
ment in late 2011.
In July 2011, NIST added six standards to a new “Catalog of Standards”
(“Catalog”),265 a major new toolkit for all Smart Grid stakeholders.  The Cata-
log is a “compendium of standards and practices considered to be relevant for
the development and deployment of a robust and interoperable Smart Grid.”  It
is not “a ‘cookbook’ to ensure interoperability,” but a list of “specifications
that have significant import to enabling the Smart Grid and enhancing its capa-
bilities.”266  The criteria for a standard’s listing in the Catalog include “Commu-
nity Acceptance,” in which the standard is “widely acknowledged as
facilitating interoperability related to the integration of devices or systems that
enable Smart Grid capabilities.”267
In the third phase of its plan, NIST is developing and implementing a
framework for testing and certification of how standards are implemented in
Smart Grid devices, systems, and processes.  This is essential to ensure inter-
operability and security under real world conditions.  In 2012, NIST issued the
second version of the document explaining this process, the Interoperability
Process Reference Manual.268
2. The SGIP in Operation: PAP10 (Standard Energy Usage
Information)
One of the SGIP’s first and most important priorities was PAP10, “Stan-
dard Energy Usage Information.”269  PAP10 activities focused on an “Energy
Usage Information” (“EUI”) data model.  As the name suggests, this model
was intended to define and standardize energy usage information throughout
the Smart Grid, with the goal of making information more readily available to
consumers and third parties.  This standard is extremely important,270 specifying
264 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 32–36. R
265 SGIP Catalog of Standards, NIST SGIP, http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/
SmartGrid/SGIPCatalogOfStandards (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).  The process for adding standards to the Catalog was completed in May 2011.
NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 65.  This was after the initial submission of standards to R
FERC, and therefore led to criticism that those standards had not completed the full SGIP process
life cycle. See infra notes 295–298 and accompanying text. R
266 SGIP STANDARDS CATALOG, supra note 147, at 2. R
267 Id. at 5.
268 Updated Guidelines to Help Ensure Electrical Devices are Smart Grid Ready, NIST
ENG’G LAB. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nist.gov/el/smartgrid-012412.cfm.  The IPRM may be
found at Smart Grid Testing & Certification Committee (SGTCC), NIST SGIP, Jan., 2012, https://
collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/SmartGridTestingAndCertificationCommittee/
IPRM_final_-_011612.pdf.
269 NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0, supra note 1, at 79.  The PAP10 Standard Energy Usage Informa- R
tion website is located at NIST SGIP, supra note 258. R
270 See, e.g., GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 30 (discussing the impor- R
tance of data models to “bridge between different communities”).
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the “vocabulary that will be used by devices and services” across the Smart
Grid’s domains.271  California and Texas had already required their consumers
to have electronic access to energy usage data.272  Prompt development of a
standard was essential to this and other functions: facilitating DR, consumer
participation in energy markets, and connecting electric vehicles and DG to the
grid, among others.273
The EUI was not meant to standardize the means for exchanging data, but
instead to create a “seed” — a core set of information that could be made
available to consumers or authorized third parties.  Subsequent standards would
use this foundation to address specific uses.274  The need for this type of infor-
mation model was compelling.  Without a standard that defined key terms,
every interaction across the Smart Grid would have to redefine them anew.275
In 2010, the SGIP Governing Board requested that the PAP10 leadership
team expedite the production of an information model standard “by a recog-
nized Standards Developing Organization” meeting NTTAA requirements.276
NIST selected the NAESB for this purpose, with a parallel effort by the Ameri-
can Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers
(“ASHRAE”) to settle on facility energy information models.  By the normal
standards clock, this was a quick turnaround.
Development continued throughout 2010, culminating in the production of
the NAESB EUI standard in December 2010.277  A CSWG review found that
the EUI did not present cybersecurity problems by itself because it “does not
present requirements for communication, storage, or access to energy usage
information.”278  By separate votes of the SGIP Governing Board and members
271 Summaries of First Six Catalog of Standards Entries, NIST (July 26, 2011), http://
www.nist.gov/smartgrid/sgip-072611-factsheet.cfm.
272 See 2010 Cal. Stat. Ch. 497; CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DRAFT DECISION ADOPTING RULES
TO PROTECT THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF THE ELECTRICITY USAGE DATA OF THE CUSTOMERS
OF PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, AND SAN
DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, R.8-12-009 (2008), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/
PD/134875.pdf (implementing the statutory mandate and establishing privacy and security provi-
sions for data).
273 NIST SGIP, supra note 258. R
274 SGIP, REPORT TO THE SGIP GOVERNING BOARD: PAP10 PLAN 2 (2010), available at http:/
/www.naesb.org/pdf4/smart_grid_pap10_062210w6.pdf [hereinafter SGIP PAP10 2010 PLAN]
(“PAP10 will not cover all interactions associated with energy in the home or commercial space.
Additional standard information models will be necessary to support load management, for exam-
ple.  Additionally, the proposed standard will be limited to defining an information model only.
The implementation of messaging using the model and the syntax by which messaging is encoded
is left to SDOs and Standards Setting Organizations that will use the ‘seed’ standard.”).
275 NIST SGIP, supra note 258 (noting that “[i]n the absence of these standards, software R
developers and utilities would have to negotiate pair-wise interfaces, an impractical situation”).
276 SGIP PAP10 2010 PLAN, supra note 274, at 1. R
277 The NAESB EUI model is described in detail in NAESB, NAESB ENERGY USAGE INFOR-
MATION MODEL (2010), available at http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/naesb_energy_usage_informa-
tion_model.pdf.
278 See NIST Smart Grid Collaboration Wiki, SGIP CoS: NAESB PAP10 Energy Usage Infor-
mation, NIST SGIP, http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/SGIPCos-
SIFNAESBREQ18WEQ19 (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
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(in January and June 2011, respectively), the standard was approved and added
to the Catalog of Standards.279
Among the most anticipated extensions of the EUI was the actual ex-
change mechanism for customer access to energy usage information.  “The
NAESB Energy Services Provider Interface” (“ESPI”) standard, designed to
provide a standardized process and interface for this purpose, became official at
the end of 2011.280  The standard “defines a consistent method for the authori-
zation of third party access to retail consumer’s usage information and a stan-
dardized interface for the exchange of that information.”281
An excellent example of how the combination of the EUI and ESPI are
already being used in the Smart Grid is the “Green Button Initiative,” an-
nounced by U.S. Chief Technology Officer Aneesh Chopra in January 2012 as
an effort to give consumers “standard, routine, easy-to-understand access to
their own energy usage data.”282  California’s three major investor-owned utili-
ties (PG&E, SDG&E, and Southern California Edison) promoted the Green
Button idea.283  Their websites are based on the NAESB standards.  They allow
consumers to download their energy usage information in a straightforward,
standardized format, and share it (if they so choose) with authorized third
parties.284
This is as revolutionary in its significance as the Internet’s first uses, for it
hints at the potential for much more robust uses of the data.285
IV. FERC’S ORDER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SMART GRID DEVELOPMENT
AND ENERGY LAW FEDERALISM
In 2010, NIST requested that FERC put a stamp of approval on a handful
of standards, a small fraction of those identified in the Framework.  However,
279 See NIST FRAMEWORK 2.0, supra note 5, at 83; NIST SGIP, supra note 278; Press Re- R
lease, Smart Grid Panel Approves Six Standards for Catalog, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/smart-
grid/sgip-072611.cfm (John McDonald, SGIP Governing Board Chair, commenting that “[t]he
energy usage information standard may very well be the most interesting to consumers at this
point”).
280 Press Release, NAESB, NAESB Announces Launch of ESPI Web Site to Support the
Green Button Initiative (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.naesb.org/pdf4/012512press_release.pdf.
281 Id.
282 See, e.g., Green Button: Providing Consumers with Access to Their Energy Data, DOE
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/green-button-providing-consumers-access-their-energy-
data; Introducing Green Button, NIST (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/
upload/1-20-12_Green_Button_Webinar_-_Wollman_and_Irwin.pdf; Jeff St. John, How Federal
Legislation Could Change Digital Energy Data, GIGAOM (June 1, 2011), http://gigaom.com/cle-
antech/how-federal-legislation-could-change-digital-energy-data/.
283 Standards Gurus Propose Way to Get More Uutilities on Board with SGIP, SMART GRID
TODAY ( Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/3488print.cfm.
284 Green Button, PGE, http://www.pge.com/greenbutton/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
285 Mike Orcutt, The Energy Use of New York City’s Buildings, Visualized, TECH. REVIEW
(Feb. 13, 2012) http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/energy/27550/?nlid=nldly&nld=2012-
02-14 (discussing the use of a model for energy consumption in New York that could be improved
with better data).
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the significance of the request extended far beyond the standards’ technical
merits.  The discussion over whether FERC should “adopt” the standards be-
came a high-stakes test of the Smart Grid’s future and the process by which it
will be developed.  Utilities, vendors, PUCs, and others debated major themes,
including how stakeholders should govern the standard-setting process (and, by
extension, have authority over the Smart Grid going forward) and how federal
and state actors will interact with each other.  These issues dominated a lengthy
public discussion.
The request itself involved five families of standards developed by the
International Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”),286 one of three organiza-
tions that set international standards for electric and electronic technologies.
The IEC standards are “extremely detailed, highly prescriptive technical speci-
fications, down to the point of directing which bytes go where in electronic
packets on the wire.”287  As industry standards go, they are a no-brainer.  NIST
Administrator Arnold noted later that major IOUs rely on them in their existing
systems, quoting a utility executive’s statement that the “five IEC standards are
among the most mature in the industry.”288
Criticisms voiced to FERC ranged from fine-grained observations about
the SGIP process to broad concerns about FERC’s role and its implications for
the federal-state relationship in electric utility regulation.  After receiving the
standards, FERC solicited considerable input from Smart Grid stakeholders in
two technical conferences and a rulemaking docket.  Nearly all commenters
opposed FERC adoption.  However, most commenters praised the SGIP’s
work.289
FERC’s response addressed both viewpoints, and in doing so supported the
democratic NIST-led process for standards development, turning federalism
from a hindrance for Smart Grid development into a positive framework for
implementation.  Its order stated that the standards did not have “sufficient
consensus,” so it would not proceed with a rulemaking proceeding to “adopt”
those standards as mandatory FERC regulations.290  This sounds like rejection,
286 Welcome to the IEC, IEC, http://www.iec.ch/about/, (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
287 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Ron Highfill), at 29.  As an R
example, the IEC 61970 standards “define application-level energy management system interfaces
and messaging for distribution grid management in the utility space.”  NIST FRAMEWORK 1.0,
supra note 1, at 54; INT’L ELECTROTECH-NICAL COMM‘N, SUMMARY OF USE, APPLICATION, R
CYBERSECURITY, AND FUNCTIONALITY OF SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS IDENTIFIED
BY NIST 1 (2010), available at www.smartgridlegalnews.com/5_standards.pdf (discussing the
standards in depth).  An ongoing activity of NIST’s PAP10 is work to establish the relationship of
the NAESB EUI standard with this family of standards.  NIST SGIP, supra note 258. R
288 Opening Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 5. R
289 Before the Department of Energy, In the Matter of Addressing Policy and Logistical Chal-
lenges to Smart Grid Implementation, Dep’t of Energy Third Request for Info. On Smart Grid
Issues (comments of AT&T, Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“NIST working
groups developing Smart Grid interoperability standards have been productive endeavors with
excellent output that will foster innovation in connection with the Smart Grid.”).
290 Understanding the implications of FERC’s decision not to adopt the standards requires
some careful thought about two unclear terms in the EISA: the threshold inquiry of “sufficient
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but its benefits are readily apparent.  For one, FERC’s order demonstrates that
regulatory agency rulemaking is not necessary in a legal framework for stan-
dards development.  FERC recognized the SGIP as an appropriate and neces-
sary forum, which is producing results and will continue to do so.  Noticing
that, without making a separate judgment about “sufficient consensus,” al-
lowed the SGIP process to continue without superimposing the additional layer
of review of a rulemaking proceeding.  This decision also let states act first in
adopting the NIST standards, rather than triggering their resentment of federal
energy regulations they perceive as intruding on their authority (and potential
litigation).
A. Blessing the Process
Although FERC does not develop interoperability standards, its role as an
energy regulator and standards adopter via the EISA makes its view critical.
The EISA allows FERC to make judgments about NIST’s efforts “[a]t any
time.”291  This envisions periodic submissions,292 but provides no guidance
about how FERC should decide when and whether “the Institute’s work” has
“led to sufficient consensus in the Commission’s judgment.”293  This gives
FERC significant leeway in interpreting the effectiveness of the NIST-led
process.294
1. Criticisms of the Process
There were a number of criticisms of the SGIP.  Some focused on the
SGIP’s due process attributes.  Commenters believed “consensus” meant that
Smart Grid stakeholders must agree that NIST has properly identified standards
for submission.295  They criticized the initial submission’s hasty timing and
consensus” and FERC’s responsibility to “adopt” standards.  NIST’s transmittal to FERC was a
brief letter naming the standards and describing their role in the Smart Grid.  NIST, NIST SMART
GRID ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SGAC) REPORT 28 (2012) [hereinafter NIST SGAC REPORT] avail-
able at www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST_SGAC_Final_Recommendations_Report_3-05-12_
with_Attachments.pdf.  That left others free to interpret the statute as they saw fit.
291 42 U.S.C.A. § 17385(d) (West 2012).
292 FERC, supra note 205, at slide 5 (FERC staff proposing to conduct periodic rulemakings). R
293 Id. at 7.  FERC staff had recommended “that the Commission generally rely on the Na-
tional Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) as guidance in determining sufficient
consensus, along with comments received in the rulemaking proceeding.”
294 See, e.g., Chris King, FERC Says “Consensus” Lacking for Smart Grid Standards: What
Consensus?, SMART GRID WATCH (July 27, 2011), http://www.emeter.com/smart-grid-watch/
2011/ferc-says-consensus-lacking-for-smart-grid-standards-what-consensus/ (noting that Enernex
chairman and CTO Erich W. Gunther observed that while FERC did not define “sufficient con-
sensus,” it could mean five different things); see also Frisby, Jr. & Trotta, supra note 73, at R
313–14.
295 Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Smart Grid Interoperability Stan-
dards, Docket No. RM11-2-000 8 (comments of the Midwest Independent Transmission System
Operators, Inc.), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Tariff/FERC%20
Filings/2011-04-22%20Docket%20No.%20RM11-2-000.pdf (calling for FERC to “independently
determine whether there is sufficient consensus that the NIST process created appropriate
standards”).
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form.296  One commenter argued NIST did not have a “formal and transparent
process so that there is broad, documented industry consensus as to exactly
when and which standards will be provided to the Commission.”297  Others
pointed out (correctly) that NIST had submitted the first batch of standards
before it had its full suite of procedures in place to add standards to the
Catalog.298
Utilities’ most persistent arguments are claims of underrepresentation in
the SGIP process.  One utility executive argued there was no “sufficient con-
sensus” because standards are not “subject to review and vote by the entire
SGIP pursuant to a balanced voting process before being placed in the SGIP’s
Catalog of Standards.”299  Utilities object to the SGIP’s supermajority voting
requirement, believing they should have a larger voice in standard-setting to
reflect their significant investments in the Smart Grid.  They make up about
10% of SGIP members, so the SGIP could therefore vote to approve a standard
over the objection of every utility member.300
296 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of John Lucas), at 36 (noting R
that “the current pace and the broad scope of the process is in our view inconsistent with estab-
lishing true and informed industry consensus, as you would find in the NERC process for setting a
standard or the NAESB process for establishing a business practice standard”).
297 Smart Grid Interoperability Standards: United States of America Before the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. RM-11-2-000 2 (2011) (comments of John A. Lucas,
Southern Company Services, Inc.), available at http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/2011013
1084230-Lucas,%20Southern.pdf [hereinafter “Lucas Docket Comments”] (adding that “I must
admit Southern is among those who were not aware that these standards would be the first stan-
dards provided to the Commission by NIST”).  Another commenter observed that sending stan-
dards five at a time would lead to piecemeal development and give inadequate guidance to the
states.  FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Gib Sorebo), at 54. R
John Lucas also believed that the standards had not achieved consensus because utilities are
underrepresented in the IEC. Lucas Docket Comments, at 2 (noting that “regulated electric utili-
ties have had limited involvement in the IEC process for the referenced five families of stan-
dards”).  Utilities do not have votes in the IEC process, but it is one of the “well-recognized,
international standards bodies” that follow the essential principles for standards development.
Introduction to AWSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/
introduction.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (not-
ing that “[a]ll ANSI-accredited standards developers follow the Essential Requirements which
embrace globally-accepted principles of standardization implemented by well-recognized, interna-
tional standards bodies such as the . . . IEC [International Electrotechnical Commission]”); see
INT’L ELECTROTECH-NICAL. COMM’N, supra note 287, at 9 (comments by IEC on cybersecurity R
review of its standards, noting that “IEC meets the requirements of NTTAA as a voluntary con-
sensus standards development organization”).
298 FERC Standards Order, supra note 16, ¶ 7 (noting that “certain aspects of the current R
NIST process were not in place during development of the NIST Framework document and identi-
fication of the IEC standards”).
299 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of John Lucas), at 38 (empha- R
sis added).
300 NIST SGAC REPORT, supra note 290, at 31 (noting that “100% of the utility companies R
could vote against some issue in the SGIP, but it could still carry the day because of the current
majority voting procedures”).  In practice, the approval level is much higher than the requisite
75%.  The first six standards added to the Catalog of Standards (including the NAESB EUI stan-
dard) were approved by 90% of the SGIP’s members. Market News, Smart Grid Panel Approved
First Six Standards, KLEANINDUSTRIES (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.kleanindustries.com/s/envi-
ronmental_market_Industry_news.asp?ReportID=475904.
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To remedy this, the commenter proposed a “super-majority of voting
members [and] a level of support from all industry segments” to approve a
standard.301  Some SDOs, including NAESB, require this.302  By definition, this
invokes a much broader issue: how the process should protect the interests of
other stakeholders, including future entrants.  The SGIP supermajority voting
requirement reflects the OMB/NTTAA principle that, “substantial agreement”
is “general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity.”303  Granting utilities a
greater say allows them to take part in the SGIP and then reject its outcome on
the grounds that the process was not “balanced.”304  It should be weighed care-
fully against the OMB/NTTAA principle that no one stakeholder should domi-
nate the process.305
Commenters also claimed that the standards were not ready because they
would not promote reliability and were not cybersecure.  While the CSWG had
assessed the standards’ cybersecurity,306 some argued that the NIST three-vol-
ume set of guidelines was “much more of a philosophical document than a
handbook for achieving a secure operating environment.”307  Numerous partici-
pants called for more rigorous review, and several called for development of a
“security addendum” to address important issues.308  NIST also would need to
coordinate with federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity, with relevant expertise and jurisdiction.  As for reliability, commenters
called for formal reviews by industry participants in conjunction with NERC,
which had not happened prior to the submission of the standards.309
301 United States Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Smart Grid Interoper-
ability Standards, Docket No. RM11-2-000 (comments of John Lucas), available at http://www.
ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20110131084230-Lucas,%20Southern.pdf.
302 CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY STANDARDS BOARD,
INC. 6 (2008) available at http://www.naesb.org/pdf/naesb_certificate_112108.pdf (requiring a
67% supermajority and 40% approval within each market segment).
303 OMB CIRCULAR, supra note 189, § 4(a)(1)(v); see also SGIP BYLAWS AND CHARTER, R
supra note 245, at 3–4; NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 29; Werbach, supra note R
11, at 209 (“[C]onsensus” is “defined as general agreement, not necessarily unanimity.”).  This R
requires careful consideration of views, including “a process for attempting to resolve objections
by interested parties, as long as all comments have been fairly considered, each objector is advised
of the disposition of his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body members
are given an opportunity to change their votes after reviewing the comments.” OMB CIRCULAR,
supra note 303, § 4(a)(1)(v). R
304 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of George Arnold), at 12. R
305 OMB CIRCULAR, supra note 303, § 4(a)(1)(ii). R
306 Opening Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 5. R
307 NIST SGAC REPORT, supra note 290, at 29. R
308 See, e.g., FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Michael As- R
sante), at 79, 83 (noting that “an insufficient number of experts in cyber security, control system
security, and utility operations were engaged in an informed manner throughout the review pro-
cess” and that “direct necessary addendums . . . to address identified concerns and provide credi-
ble security guidance [should be provided] along with adoption or design implementation of the
standards”); FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Daniel Thanos), at 25 R
(commenting that the optimal cybersecurity solution was “the developing of an overriding secur-
ity addendum that must be adopted along with the standards”).
309 NIST SGAC REPORT, supra note 290, at 19 (“There is a gap in terms of reliability and R
implementation reviews within the SGIP . . . .  There needs to be a formal review of these inter-
operability standards with respect to the reliability and implementation readiness by industry rep-
resentatives who have the primary responsibility for safety, operation and reliability of the grid.”).
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2. FERC’s Response
FERC had to enable standards development to move forward, while ad-
dressing these complaints.  However, the EISA language boxed FERC in.
FERC had to decide whether the five families of standards had “sufficient con-
sensus.”  If that consensus existed, FERC was required to commence a
rulemaking proceeding and make a substantive judgment about the standards.
Adopting the standards would incur the wrath of those objecting to a federal
mandate.  Rejecting them, for whatever reason, might cast doubt on the SGIP
process.  If FERC found there was no consensus, it might also impugn that
process.
NIST itself suggested that FERC “could send appropriate signals to the
marketplace by recommending use of the NIST Framework without mandating
compliance with particular standards.”310  Simultaneously, FERC could value
the SGIP’s work by endorsing the SGIP process.  In its order of July 2011,
FERC therefore stated, “we find insufficient consensus to institute a rulemak-
ing proceeding at this time to adopt the five families of standards.”311  It did not
elaborate on what it meant by “consensus,” except to observe that
“[c]ommenters are nearly unanimous that we should not adopt these standards
at this time, citing concerns with cyber security deficiencies and potential unin-
tended consequences from premature adoption of individual standards.”312  It
added an important paragraph, which stated: “We believe that the best vehicle
for developing smart grid interoperability standards is the NIST interoperability
framework process, including the work of the SGIP and its committees and
working groups.”313
As an example, FERC could not have been clearer about how it expects
cybersecurity to be addressed.  In the order, it stated, “[s]takeholders con-
cerned with smart grid cyber security should actively participate in the NIST
interoperability framework process, including the SGIP Cyber Security Work-
ing Group.”314  As FERC noted, NIST has strengthened its reliability and
cybersecurity review processes.315  FERC expects these processes to be the cen-
tral forum for resolving these important issues.
It may be appropriate for FERC to review some standards to the extent
they are necessary to ensure cybersecurity or reliability.316  However, FERC’s
order makes its review secondary to allowing the crowd of stakeholders to ad-
dress and resolve important issues.  This allows the SGIP flexibility to adapt to
concerns about “sufficient consensus” more quickly than a regulatory process
310 FERC Standards Order, supra note 16, ¶ 9. R
311 Id. ¶ 1.
312 Id. ¶ 7.
313 Id. ¶ 10.
314 Id. ¶ 12.
315 Id. ¶ 11.
316 See NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 29 n.32 (“We firmly believe that R
there will be appropriate reasons for FERC to mandate the use of specific standards in the future
and EISA gives them the authority to make that call.”).
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can.317  In some cases, the SGIP has made changes already (for example, devel-
oping the Catalog),318 and others are contemplated.  This evolution is useful.
The dynamic relationship between standards and Smart Grid architecture319 dic-
tates that standard-setting itself should be an evolving process.  Like standards
themselves, the structure has to be flexible and accommodate change.  By not
interpreting “sufficient consensus,” FERC recognized that stakeholders them-
selves can steer the SGIP’s evolution, making process changes when they deem
it necessary.
This has major significance for future Smart Grid governance.  Smart Grid
stakeholders, like those of the Internet, should have a strong stake in the net-
work’s future.  If achieving “sufficient consensus” requires changes to the
SGIP process, the appropriate remedy is not first and foremost for FERC to
make those decisions, although FERC’s position guarantees it will have influ-
ence if it chooses to use it.  If utilities believe they are underrepresented in the
SGIP process, they should make that argument to the full complement of Smart
Grid stakeholders, not one central regulator.  The open public process also
makes capture of the SGIP process less likely than capture of a regulatory
agency.320  However, if FERC notices that one actor has dominated the SGIP’s
process for setting a specific standard, it might step in to articulate that a con-
sensus has not been reached.
B. Treating Federalism as a Means for Implementation Instead of a Barrier
In the technical conferences and rulemaking docket, the meaning of
“adopt” was “the question everyone [had] in mind,”321 and it became a light-
ning rod for a host of concerns about federalism and FERC’s role in the stan-
dard-setting process.
1. Concerns of Smart Grid Stakeholders
A FERC staff member asked a technical conference panelist whether
“there is a spectrum of ‘adopt’ where it really means ‘not necessarily looking to
adopt individual standards, but as I understood it, kind of blessing a process
somehow or other.’” 322  According to this interpretation, “adopt” might mean
“approve” or “endorse,” as in “I adopt the Chairman’s view of the issue.”  As
317 United States of America Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Smart Grid
Interoperability Standards, Docket No. RM11-2-000 27 (2011) (comments of Edison Elec. Inst.)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (suggesting that the “five families of standards”
should be referred back for evaluation through improved NIST processes).
318 Presumably, going forward, NIST would submit only those standards to FERC that are in
the Catalog, “thereby assuring they have completed the SGIP life cycle and they have documented
stakeholder support.”  FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Ron Am- R
brosio), at 85–86.
319 Quinn & Reed, supra note 64, at 868. R
320 Lemley, supra note 186, at 1063–64. R
321 Opening Remarks to FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10, at 6.
322 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of Ray Palmer), at 75.
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numerous commenters recognized, “adopt” could also mean “to select as basic
or required,” as, for example, “adopting” a textbook.  FERC had suggested in
2009 that it could mandate standards for all domains of the grid and all partici-
pants,323 although, as noted above, it was not clear how it would enforce a
mandate.324
Mandatory regulation was commenters’ single greatest concern. The most
frequent argument against it was that technical standards are typically adopted
by the private sector in a “voluntary” process, not by “mandatory” federal
rulemaking.325  PUCs also opposed mandatory standards because they, not
FERC, have authority over distribution-level projects.326  One PUC believed
FERC should merely encourage states to adopt standards and limit its role to
securing compliance and enforcement once standards were in place.327  A
FERC mandate would diminish PUCs’ power, tilting regulatory authority to-
ward FERC and away from them.328  States are virtually unwilling to cede any
authority to FERC.  In their comments, several states refused to endorse FERC
support for the SGIP process, viewing even that relatively benign step as an
intrusive federal mandate.  States want guidance, but not if FERC tells them
what to do.
State commenters even opposed a FERC mandate to comply with the stan-
dards in FERC’s own area of exclusive jurisdiction, “interstate transmission of
electric power, and regional and wholesale electricity markets.”329  They wor-
ried that standards might gain traction and work their way down to the local
level.  States are responsible for distribution-level activities, but that line will
seem arbitrary when the issue under consideration is whether a smart meter can
communicate with a device located on another part of the grid in another state.
Many commenters (including utilities and PUCs) supported their objec-
tions to FERC mandates by arguing that mandated standards preserve technolo-
323 FERC Smart Grid Policy, supra note 23, ¶ 22.  Utilities’ fears may stem in part from their R
experience with standards that transformed from voluntary to mandatory: Reliability standards
morphed from guidelines of an informal, industry-centered regime to a mandatory regime that
NERC enforces.  That required an act of Congress. See 16 U.S.C. § 824o(e)(3) (West 2012).  The
EISA, of course, gave FERC the authority to adopt mandatory standards within its jurisdictional
area.
324 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 23–24 (discussing the lack of R
oversight authority).
325 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of George Arnold), at 16 (“In R
general, industry has a strong preference not to see standards adopted in regulation.  This concern
will naturally motivate many industry participants to cite reasons why FERC should not consider
adopting these or other standards.”).
326 See, e.g., Empowering Consumers and Promoting Innovation through the Smart Grid:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation of the Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, 112th Cong. 5–6 (2011) (comments of Donna Nelson, Chairman, Public
Utility Commission of Texas: “State commissions maintain jurisdiction over the distribution grid
. . . .  While some have advocated for a federal package of mandatory standards for adoption, we
do not believe that the federal government should take action to mandate standards.”)
327 Smart Grid Interoperability Standards: United States of America Before the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. RM112-000 5-6 (2011) (comments of Colorado Public
Utility Commission).
328 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 90 n.99. R
329 42 U.S.C.A. § 17385(d) (West 2012).
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gies in amber, making them potentially obsolete later.  Coming from utilities,
the irony of this is palpable.  Monopolists with control over the electricity sys-
tem are arguing that setting standards will retard innovation by fostering the
entrenchment of a status quo at some unspecified later date.330  If standards are
not developed, the outcome is the status quo: utilities’ continued economic
dominance, in part due to government mandates that have fostered the existing
electric system’s development.  In any event, if the NIST Catalog is a “toolkit,”
and not a “rulebook,” this objection is less relevant.  A state that believes the
Catalog standards are not state-of-the-art is free to depart from them.
2. FERC’s Response
FERC’s response finessed the question about whether regulatory “adop-
tion” is necessary to ensure that the Smart Grid is standardized and what steps
FERC will take going forward.331  As counterintuitive as it might seem, FERC’s
decision may have been the best choice for the Smart Grid’s future.  Silence on
many matters is indeed golden.  One executive of an SDO observed, “the
FERC decision is neither a rejection of the NIST consensus process nor the
adoption of global standards for the Smart Grid.”332
FERC has recognized, without saying so, that adoption will be unneces-
sary for most interoperability standards.333  There are compelling reasons why
FERC need not substitute its judgment for that of the SGIP process.  As Profes-
sor Mark Lemley has observed, “government agencies are generally composed
of career public servants, not market participants [and] often do not involve the
most qualified individuals in the industry at the moment in the standard-setting
process.”334  He describes this as “an inherent danger of bureaucracy, particu-
larly when it attempts to regulate such a fast-moving area of commerce as the
Internet.”335  Given the similarity of the Smart Grid to the Internet in size, scale,
and dynamism, this is a serious concern here, too.  The involvement of the
330 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 98 n.105. R
331 See, e.g., Chris King, FERC Says “Consensus” Lacking for Smart Grid Standards: What
Consensus?, SMART GRID WATCH (Jul. 27, 2011), http://www.emeter.com/smart-grid-watch/2011/
ferc-says-consensus-lacking-for-smart-grid-standards-what-consensus/ (“[S]aying that ‘consen-
sus has not been reached’ alone is too vague without saying consensus on what.”); Jesse Berst,
Smart Grid Standards Slowdown Puts Utilities at Risk, SMARTGRIDNEWS.COM (Jul. 26, 2011),
http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/publish/Technologies_Standards/Smart-grid-standards-
slowdown-puts-utilities-at-risk-3863.html (“FERC also failed to give any guidance on what hap-
pens next.  Whether the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) should continue to
work on the standards.  Whether and when FERC should reconsider them.  Whether we should
just give up and pack it in.”).
332 NEMA Responds to FERC Ruling on Smart Grid Standards, NAT’L ELEC. MFRS.  ASS’N
(Jul. 21, 2011), http://www.nema.org/News/Pages/NEMA-Responds-to-FERC-Ruling-on-Smart-
Grid-Standards.aspx.
333 This is consistent with the comments of NIST Administrator Arnold at the technical con-
ference.  FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of George Arnold), at 8 (“I R
recommend that the Commission consider taking a different approach that focuses on the question
of whether regulatory adoption is needed to insure use of the standards by industry to achieve
smart grid interoperability.”).
334 Lemley, supra note 186, at 1063. R
335 Id.
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states adds a layer of complexity.  FERC would face serious challenges if it
tried to keep track of the electricity standards “market”: what 51 different juris-
dictions are doing at any given moment.336
Instead, FERC is now able to play a more ideal role for a central govern-
ment actor in a vibrant and functioning federalist system of standard-setting.
The federal government is at its best in standard-setting when it brokers a col-
laboration of collaborations in which participants without common understand-
ing can work together.337  It is a creative and dynamic approach that we might
think of as government-led crowdsourcing.338  As one SDO executive observed,
the “[c]atalog of Standards provides the perfect venue to conform to the FERC
order.”339  Congress believed mandated standards were necessary to promote
rapid standard-setting and to overcome coordination difficulties.  However, ac-
ceptance by the community that implements them — the touchstone of all con-
sensus standards — does not flow from a regulator’s endorsement, but from use
of standards in practice.
Agency rulemaking is inconsistent with that tradition.  It is also an ineffi-
cient means for establishing standards.  Standards are dynamic instruments, and
if a standard imposed by rule did not work in practice, the only recourse would
be a new rule.  The threshold for considering a revised rule would be different
(the agency could refuse to revisit its decision), and, of course, the new rule
would be subject to all of the procedural requirements, and potential for delay,
as the original one.  The principal check on a suboptimal decision by an agency
is judicial review, which employs standards that focus on whether a court
should substitute its judgment for that of the agency, not on the standards’ tech-
nical merits.
With hundreds of standards to be evaluated, setting standards by rule in-
troduces the potential for high transaction costs and delay.340  Approval of the
first five standards encountered strong opposition, so it is entirely foreseeable
that powerful stakeholders would attempt to tie up standards in costly litigation
that could potentially keep them from becoming final for years.  Such uncer-
336 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 21 (“Unless FERC and other regu- R
lators have a good understanding of whether utilities and manufacturers are following smart grid
standards, it will be difficult to know whether a voluntary approach to standards setting is effec-
tive or if changes are needed.”).
337 FERC Standards Order, supra note 16, ¶ 10 (noting that the SGIP “brings together smart R
grid stakeholders from numerous industries and areas of expertise to guide the development of
smart grid interoperability standards”).
338 Cf. Kara Platoni, Tide Pools and Terrorists, STAN. MAG. (Jan.-Feb. 2012), available at
http://alumni.stanford.edu/get/page/magazine/article/?article_id=46396 (“Instead of relying on a
centralized brain or controller for everything, you farm out the responsibility of searching for and
responding to changes in the environment to many, many different agents.”).
339 NAT’L ELEC. MFRS. ASS’N, supra note 332. R
340 FERC, supra note 205, at slide 5 (“Because the first group of standards is not likely to R
address all key priorities identified by NIST and the Commission, Staff anticipates continuing
development of new standards and modification to existing standards to address these priorities,
with additional notifications from NIST on a regular basis.  As such, staff recommends that the
Commission periodically initiate rulemaking proceedings in response to postings of new smart
grid interoperability standards by NIST.”).
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tainty would mean that projects would proceed without standards, which could
jeopardize interoperability.341
Given the rulemaking process’s inefficiencies, the SGIP process should
yield quicker results.  Without federal rules, NIST cannot require adoption of
standards, but the Catalog will send strong signals about the preferences of
large numbers of stakeholders.  Utilities and PUCs have relied on voluntary
consensus standards for decades and can do so here.  Some already have, such
as the three major California utilities implementing the Green Button Initiative.
This shows how the interoperability “toolkit” may find repeated use in the
future, and also demonstrates, as noted above, how utilities may support the
SGIP process.  The force of the standards may eventually crowd out objectors.
C. The Future of Standards — Adoption at the State Level
Where does this leave the states?  After the FERC order, they do not have
to adopt standards in the Catalog, but they are free to do so.342  They can review
projects under their normal criteria, and deem imprudent any project that does
not follow applicable standards, disallowing cost recovery.343  Some states have
indicated that they want utilities to use standards as a source of best practices.
As the Catalog grows, the states may rely upon it as a valuable technical re-
source.  Proceeding without FERC’s approval signals that the standards’ credi-
bility, like that of other voluntary consensus standards, will derive from their
use in Smart Grid projects.
By not adopting the standards, FERC left the distribution of jurisdiction
over the electric grid unchanged and postponed perhaps forever the threat of a
federal/state power struggle over the Smart Grid’s foundation.  This decision
signals that suggesting FERC could affect the retail electricity market with
Smart Grid standards was overreaching.  By declining to mandate standards,
FERC has neither regulated nor ceded the prospect of a regulatory role in the
distribution side of the Smart Grid.  It retains its authority under the EISA, and
in limited instances, FERC can take discrete actions on standards to preserve
reliability and ensure cybersecurity.
In the near-term, NIST will add more standards to the Catalog.  States
should become more comfortable with the standards as they approve projects
that rely on them.  Other events may provide additional reasons to use the stan-
dards.  States’ energy and climate change policies (for example, the California
and Texas data availability requirements that led to the Green Button Initiative)
341 FERC Technical Conference 2011, supra note 10 (statement of George Arnold), at 7–8 R
(“By the time the Commission adopts rules on the many individual standards in the NIST Frame-
work, which could take years, significant investments in grid modernization will already have
occurred, and there is the danger that a lot of investment will continue to be made in proprietary
systems that do not support smart grid interoperability.”).
342 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 90; NIST SGIP, supra note 265 (“[I]mplementers may R
have good reasons to choose something not listed.  However, using an entry in the catalog may
help explain choices to others.”)
343 BROWN ET AL., supra note 61, at 90. R
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may drive use of the standards.  The Smart Grid will grow and evolve, without
mandatory standards.  FERC can limit its role to resolving conflicts between
states if the states adopt incompatible technologies and standards.
FERC can step in if necessary in three distinct cases: when it sees states’
actions leading to balkanization of Smart Grid standards, when it believes eco-
nomic interests unfairly dominated the SGIP process, and when it believes na-
tional objectives such as cybersecurity have not been achieved.344  Think of this
as a dynamic fine-tuning federalism.  The large and diverse group of Smart
Grid stakeholders is defining what the Smart Grid is in real time, with concur-
rent decisions about law and technology.345  Smartness in this complex, mul-
tifaceted environment, with its many uncertainties, demands that regulators
adapt to changing ideas of how to govern the Smart Grid.  Smart Grid federal-
ism can be smart: an open, evolving relationship, not a static entity.  In a sense,
the dynamism called for here compares to climate change federalism, where the
relationship between states and the federal government has evolved as states
innovate to respond to climate concerns and federal activity promotes uniform
solutions.346  FERC’s action, and the continuation of the SGIP process, will al-
low for standards to be developed while striking a balance between necessary
caution about upending the electricity system all at once and doing what will
eventually be essential to promote innovation.
CONCLUSION
The need for Smart Grid interoperability standards is obvious, and some
support from the federal government in developing them is necessary.  Yet
FERC’s order appeared to reject a set of standards that had widespread ap-
proval.  That decision, this Article argues, was proper.  A flexible approach that
allows the Smart Grid to evolve, just as the Internet developed, will yield better
results than trying to dictate mandatory standards today.
The significance of NIST’s standard-setting efforts cannot be underesti-
mated.  When the Smart Grid’s history is written, standards in the NIST Frame-
work such as SEP 2.0 and early stage uses of the interoperability standards such
as the Green Button Initiative will be seen as the forerunners of many more
344 At least one state that opposed mandatory standards suggested they might be necessary in
the third case listed here. See United States of America Before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Docket No. RM11-2-000 1–3, 5–6 (2011)
(initial comments of Michigan Public Service Commission) (on file with Harvard Law School
Library) (opposing enforceable standards, with the exception of limited areas such as those needed
to ensure cybersecurity).
345 LBNL SMART GRID 101 CH. 1-3, supra note 19, at 16 (“[A]lmost all of the benefits R
require concurrent implementation of policy, rate, and technology options.”).
346 See Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons From State Climate
Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653 (2008) for a discussion of dynamism under tension
between the states and federal government in fashioning climate change solutions”; see also Ann
E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2009)
(discussing “iterative federalism” whereby “federal law consciously designates a particular and
distinct state or group of states to regulate and relies on that regulatory arrangement to enhance
compliance with federal standards”).
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robust and useful uses of energy information.  The SGIP process will be hailed
as foundational to a wide range of energy saving technologies, and the stan-
dards will be honored as landmarks of the modern technology age.
An expanded federal role may be necessary in the long run.  Federal pre-
emption with an open access law may eventually be required to match the
Smart Grid’s national scale and promote new firms and applications.  Yet for
now, relying on the states’ authority over local distribution is essential.  The
shift to a Smart Grid will not occur instantaneously.  New firms that would
seek to use local distribution wires largely do not yet exist.  Profound near-term
regulatory change would be like swapping pilots in an airplane at 30,000 feet.
One can envision that shifting market conditions may motivate utilities to seek
change, just as shifting market conditions for phone service in the 1990s, in
particular the rise of cheap long distance calling, led phone companies to seek
change by federal regulation.347  For now, that is years away.  Adopting stan-
dards today would require making a lasting statement about the federal-state
relationship at a time when preemption is not yet warranted.
In the current climate, it is difficult for FERC to expand its power.  Later,
it may not be.  After circumstances change, a decision about adopting standards
may do no more than ratify an existing consensus, instead of forcing it on
stakeholders today.  However, FERC’s decision puts off this confrontation until
a point when it may not appear to be a confrontation at all.  That is profoundly
smart.
347 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction 45,
55–56, in THE LIMITS AND COMPLEXITY OF ORGANIZATIONS (Richard R. Nelson, ed. 2005), avail-
able at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Telecommunications_Regulation.pdf.
Utilities have led industry transitions before.  In the early 20th century, utilities supported the
move from municipal franchises to state regulation. ASHLEY C. BROWN, THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS FOR REGULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2005),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/brown_papers/ABrown_IndiaPlanning_1-05.pdf.
Although it may appear unlikely today, if market conditions change, utilities may eventually
prompt a similar move to federal Smart Grid regulation.
